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ABSTRACT 
 
MELISSA M. JENKINS: Cognitive De-Biasing and the Assessment of Pediatric Bipolar 
Disorder  
(Under the direction of Eric A. Youngstrom, PhD) 
 
 Decades of research have demonstrated that relying solely on clinical judgment 
leaves one prone to a host of cognitive errors that compromise optimal decision-making. 
Clinical judgment appears to be particularly vulnerable to faulty heuristics and biases when 
assessing for pediatric bipolar disorder, as evidenced by staggering rates of misdiagnosis and 
overdiagnosis. Despite abundant evidence documenting the problems associated with clinical 
judgment, little research to date has explored the effectiveness of targeted interventions, or 
cognitive de-biasing strategies, for improving clinical judgment in mental health practice. 
The present project developed an intervention aimed at reducing cognitive-based error in the 
assessment of pediatric bipolar disorder. The study design was a randomized controlled trial 
and participants were mental health professionals (N = 79) with experience treating pediatric 
populations. The treatment and control groups responded to similar case vignettes and 
primary outcome measures were clinicians’ diagnoses and treatment decisions. Unlike 
participants in the control group, participants in the treatment group received the cognitive 
de-biasing intervention and evidenced greater overall judgment accuracy, p < .0005. 
Participants in the treatment group also committed significantly fewer decision-making 
errors, p < .0005. Study findings can significantly advance the mental health field as 
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improving clinical judgment, especially in cases of complicated diagnoses such as pediatric 
bipolar, are scientific and clinical priorities. 
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Cognitive De-Biasing and the Assessment of Pediatric Bipolar Disorder 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Overview of Proposed Study 
  
 Pediatric bipolar disorder (PBD) has been in the spotlight of both clinical and 
research communities as well as the media and popular press (Kluger & Song, 2002; Papolos 
& Papolos, 2006). Diagnoses of PBD have risen at alarming rates, with some estimates 
showing as much as a 40-fold increase in diagnoses over the last decade (Blader & Carlson, 
2007; Moreno, et al., 2007).  Research suggests that PBD is frequently misdiagnosed (low 
accuracy, including low sensitivity), and overdiagnosed (low diagnostic specificity) 
(Hirschfeld, Lewis, & Vornik, 2003; Kessler, Rubinow, Holmes, Abelson, & Zhao, 1997; 
Lish, Dime-Meenan, Whybrow, Price, & Hirschfeld, 1994). Clinicians miss true cases of 
bipolar and diagnose PBD in many cases where the youth does not actually have the disorder.  
 Clinicians frequently rely on clinical judgment for making important decisions, yet 
clinical judgment is vulnerable to cognitive errors such as faulty heuristics (i.e., cognitive 
shortcuts) and biases that often result in suboptimal diagnostic decisions (Aegisdottir, et al., 
2006; Croskerry, 2002; Galanter & Patel, 2005). For example, retrospection, hindsight bias, 
and availability can hinder judgment accuracy (cf. Hastie & Dawes, 2001), and psychologists 
inadvertently commit biased hypothesis testing (Pfeiffer, Whelan, & Martin, 2000; Strohmer, 
Shivy, & Chiodo, 1990) and invoke stereotypes about race, ethnicity, and homosexuality 
(Casas, Brady, & Ponterotto, 1983; Ridley, Li, & Hill, 1998; Wampold, Casas, & Atkinson, 
1981; Wisch & Mahalik, 1999). Focusing on PBD, inadequacies in the decision-making 
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process occur when clinicians use clinical judgment alone to assess bipolar symptoms, with 
significant variation in clinicians’ interpretation of identical case information 1. 
 The context of decision-making is an important consideration, especially given that 
heuristics can also serve as useful templates by expediting processing and synthesizing 
information (i.e., not always lead to inaccurate judgments). Evidence suggests that humans 
are more prone to commit faulty “cognitive heuristics” when the condition of interest is rare 
(Davidow & Levinson, 1993), and judgmental capabilities do not necessarily improve with 
additional experience (Brehmer, 1980, 1998; Faust, 1986; Faust, 1994; Faust, et al., 1988; 
Faust & Ziskin, 1988; Garb, 1989; Spengler, et al., 2009; Wedding, 1991; Wiggins, 1973; 
Ziskin, 1995). There is even evidence suggesting that more experienced clinicians may be at 
greater risk for biased judgment than novice clinicians (Strohmer & Leierer, 2000). Given the 
frequent misdiagnosis and overdiagnosis of PBD as well as it being a relatively rare 
condition, the risk for cognitive error seems to be especially high in clinicians’ assessment of 
bipolar symptomotology. Unfortunately, evidence does not suggest that additional clinical 
experience will necessarily increase judgment accuracy. In the case of bipolar disorder, 
correct diagnosis is important for many reasons, including prescribing the most effective 
pharmacological treatment. 
 Improving clinical decision-making is a national health care priority (Mass, 2003). 
Despite a rich literature on the problems associated with clinical judgment, there is a dearth 
of information about strategies for improvement. Specifically, mechanisms for cognitively 
de-biasing clinicians’ judgment, such as education and training in decision-making, are not 
readily available. Research suggests that actuarial assessment methods can lead to more 
accurate and efficient diagnostic decisions for pediatric bipolar illness (Jenkins, et al., 2011); 
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however, even these methods necessitate clinical judgment to maximize their clinical utility, 
or for them to be implemented in the first place (Youngstrom, Freeman, & Jenkins, 2009).  
 Better understanding how to reduce clinicians’ use of faulty heuristics and biases can 
improve clinical judgment and increase the number of accurate diagnoses for difficult, high-
stakes conditions such as PBD.  In contrast to current research efforts in mental health, the 
medical decision-making literature has catalogued over thirty failed cognitive dispositions to 
respond (CDRs) (e.g., heuristics, biases, sanctions, fallacies, and errors) and has 
recommended strategies for reducing cognitive-based error (Croskerry, 2002, 2003; Graber, 
Gordon, & Franklin, 2002). Substantial clinical utility can be gained in mental health from 
unpacking the cognitive errors associated with clinical judgment and developing targeted 
interventions to rectify them. This objective is consistent with recommendations of Spengler 
et al. (2009), who explain that additional clinical experience may reinforce existing strategies 
while increased education experience, particularly training in decision-making, may enhance 
the quality of clinicians’ strategies.  
 Training clinicians in decision-making has considerable appeal, even among those 
who are pessimistic about the role of experience in professional competence (e.g., Swets, 
Dawes, & Monahan, 2000). Notably, although cognitive de-biasing strategies are not at 
present widely taught in training programs, and the mental health literature is still relatively 
young in this domain, the decision-making and cognitive psychology literatures offer several 
promising methods that can translate to psychiatric conditions, such as PBD, and can inform 
intervention (Croskerry, 2003). In fact, some of these strategies have already demonstrated 
improved judgment accuracy for psychiatric diagnoses, including PBD (Jenkins, et al., 2011).   
  
4 
 
 While clinical judgment is especially vulnerable to cognitive error in assessing cases 
of bipolar disorder, poor clinical judgment affects other diagnostic and treatment decisions as 
well (Galanter & Patel, 2005; McClellan, Werry, & Ham, 1993; Reimherr & McClellan, 
2004). In general, humans typically do not use purely rational or normative approaches in 
making decisions (Lau & Coiera, 2007; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974), and this is evident and 
problematic in a variety of professional settings. For example, exorbitant fees result from 
unnecessary medical tests and procedures (Kraemer, 1992). The validity of clinical judgment 
and the amount of clinical experience are unrelated (Lueger, 2002). Clinical judgment can 
derail accurate decision-making (Dawes, Faust, & Meehl, 1989; Grove, Zald, Lebow, Snitz, 
& Nelson, 2000; Meehl, 1954), and this derailment does not necessarily self-correct with 
additional clinical experience alone. Taken together, developing new, concrete strategies to 
help clinicians make more rational decisions and to avoid cognitive pitfalls is crucial- for 
PBD and other patient populations.  
 The overarching goal of the present project included developing and testing the 
effects of an intervention for improving clinical judgment. Specifically, adapting cognitive 
de-biasing strategies primarily from the medical decision-making literature, the present study 
investigated the impact of a new intervention on reducing cognitive-based errors that 
contribute to the misdiagnosis and overdiagnosis of PBD. Findings facilitate an increased 
understanding of clinicians’ cognitive vulnerabilities as well as model a new approach for 
improving clinical decision-making. 
Clinical Judgment and the Potential for Cognitive Error 
 Clinical judgment or prediction is judgment relying on informal or intuitive processes 
to combine or synthesize client data (Aegisdottir, et al., 2006). According to Redelmeier and 
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colleagues (2001), clinical judgment is the exercise of reasoning under uncertainty; and, 
often involves a combination of scientific theory, personal experience, patient perspectives, 
and other insights that missing data, conflicting information, and limited time can obscure 
(Redelmeier, 2005). With respect to assessment and diagnosis, clinical judgment largely 
refers to the decision-making task of interpretation. For example, clinicians may predict 
diagnoses by synthesizing data from clinical interviews, self-report measures, and family 
history of mental illness. Accuracy tends to be low when people use clinical judgment alone 
to perform this task (Elstein & Schwartz, 2002). In fact, mechanical or statistical prediction 
methods frequently perform as well, and even outperform in many cases, clinical judgment 
methods (Aegisdottir, et al., 2006; Grove, et al., 2000). Why does clinical judgment often 
lead to suboptimal decisions, especially when it comes to PBD? 
 PBD is an extremely challenging diagnosis (Hirschfeld, Lewis, & Vornik, 2003; 
Kessler, 1999; Lish, Dime-Meenan, Whybrow, Price, & Hirschfeld, 1994; Marchand, Wirth, 
& Simon, 2006; Youngstrom, Birmaher, & Findling, 2008; Youngstrom, Findling, 
Youngstrom, & Calabrese, 2005); however, is it possible that the way clinicians think makes 
diagnosing PBD even harder? Given the abundant associations between clinical judgment 
and cognitive errors (Elstein & Schwartz, 2002; Klein, 2005; Meehl, 1954), it is likely that 
clinicians’ cognitive processes further complicate the clinical assessment of PBD.  
 Although the current literature indicates a general problem--a high frequency of 
diagnostic error--we have little knowledge of specific heuristics that are implicated in 
misdiagnosis and how to treat them. Examining specific heuristics in cases of PBD may 
identify especially problematic mismatches between typical habits of thought and 
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characteristics of the condition. Finding ways to promote changes of habit likely includes 
both greater awareness and the adoption of cognitive de-biasing strategies. 
Pediatric Bipolar Disorder – A Public Health Crisis 
The rise in clinical diagnoses of PBD represents a major public health concern. 
Bipolar is the 6th leading cause of disability in adults (Murray, Lopez, & Mundial, 1996), 
and it is associated with a 10 to 20 times increase in suicide risk compared to the general US 
population (Bostwick & Pankratz, 2000; Brodersen, Licht, Vestergaard, Olesen, & 
Mortensen, 2000; Guze & Robins, 1970; Harris & Barraclough, 1997; Sharma & Markar, 
1994). Bipolar is also associated with substantial economic burden and medical conditions, 
including cardiovascular, endocrine, and alcohol use problems as well as significantly higher 
rates of diabetes, Hepatitis C, lower back pain, and pulmonary conditions (Dunner, 2003; 
Kupfer, 2005; Murray et al., 1996; Stang et al., 2006).  
 Serious consequences are associated with the misdiagnosis of PBD (Dunner, 2003). 
Untreated cases may follow a progressive and deteriorating course of illness (Geller, Tillman, 
Craney, & Bolhofner, 2004), and there is some evidence that wrong medication, such as 
antidepressants or stimulants, can possibly worsen outcome (cf. Joseph, Youngstrom, & 
Soares, 2009). Overdiagnosing or prematurely starting pharmacological treatment for bipolar 
is also dangerous because medications used to treat the illness can carry serious side effects 
(Wilens, et al., 2003). Suicidality is another concern with these medications (Olfson, Marcus, 
& Shaffer, 2006; Tondo, Isacsson, & Baldessarini, 2003). Diagnostic accuracy seems 
imperative before starting treatment (Weller, Danielyan, & Weller, 2004); however, 
heterogeneity of bipolar and the role of developmental influences create complex clinical 
presentations (Leibenluft, Charney, Towbin, Bhangoo, & Pine, 2003).  
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 Research indicates an average delay of more than ten years between first episode and 
diagnosis of bipolar disorder (Hirschfeld, et al., 2003; Lish et al., 2004). Another recent study 
found that five or more years elapsed from the onset of symptoms until a PBD diagnosis was 
made for more than half of youths in a community mental health setting (Marchand, et al., 
2006). Moreover, despite evidence that clinical judgment is prone to a host of errors (Dawes, 
1996), practitioners are slow to change their approach (Dawes, et al., 1989). Given that 
misdiagnosis and treatment delays can have harmful consequences, research is needed to 
better understand clinicians’ cognitive vulnerabilities (i.e., where mistakes occur) and the 
acceptability of reliable and efficient assessment strategies among practitioners (i.e., how to 
improve practice with science). 
Cognitive Errors in Assessing Bipolar Presentations – Unpacking Misdiagnosis               
 Although PBD is a challenging diagnosis due to the complicated nature of the illness, 
the decision-making literature indicates that a number of other factors may also be at play 
(Galanter & Patel, 2005). In 1974, Tversky and Kahneman suggested that contrary to the 
normative model that people make decisions rationally and use all information available, 
people often use “heuristics” or cognitive shortcuts. Although heuristics can provide 
necessary and often useful templates for clinical decision-making, they can also lead to 
biases and cognitive errors. 
 There have been several investigations of heuristics in decision-making (Eddy, 1982; 
Lueger & Petzel, 1979b; McNeil, Pauker, Sox, & Tversky, 1982; O'Donohue & Szymanski, 
1994; Richards & Wierzbicki, 1990; Sandifer, Hordern, & Green, 1970; Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1974), a few involving mental health professionals (Dailey, 1952; Garb, 1994; 
Gauron & Dickinson, 1966; Meehl, 1960; Nisbett & Ross, 1980; Sandifer, et al., 1970; 
8 
 
Waddington & Morley, 2000; Wierzbicki, 1993). Abundant associations have been shown 
between clinical judgment and cognitive errors (Elstein & Schwartz, 2002; Galanter & Patel, 
2005). Clinicians, like many people, resist modifying or discarding ideas despite further 
evidence to the contrary (Dailey, 1952; Dawes, et al., 1989; Friedlander & Stockman, 1983; 
Herbert, Nelson, & Herbert, 1988; Hirsch & Stone, 1983; Meehl, 1960; Meehl, 1954; 
Rosenhan & Heiner, 2008; Snyder & Swan, 1978).                                                                    
 Croskerry (2002) identifies over thirty failed heuristics, biases, and cognitive 
distortions. A number of these cognitive shortcuts are highly relevant in the assessment of 
PBD; see Table 1 for some of these failed heuristics and their consequent clinical 
implications. The succeeding paragraphs will provide a framework for how particular 
heuristics highlighted in Croskerry’s (2002) review map on to clinicians’ decision-making 
around cases of pediatric bipolar illness and the related challenges of assessing bipolar 
disorder.          
Challenge 1 – The Cyclical Nature of the Illness 
 Diagnostic decisions and reliability of clinical impressions are challenged by the 
cyclical nature of bipolar illness (Bowring & Kovacs, 1992). Case presentations appear very 
differently depending on whether a client is experiencing florid mania, severe depression, 
mixed or a euthymic state (Youngstrom, 2005). Consequently, clinicians often fail to detect 
hypo/mania, and they neglect the possibility of PBD in their diagnoses, case 
conceptualizations, and treatment plans. This clinical reality supports the likelihood of the 
heuristic base-rate neglect--failing to adequately take into account the prevalence of a 
particular disease. The frequency and seriousness of base-rate neglect is highlighted by 
epidemiological studies suggesting that bipolar is more common than researchers and 
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clinicians previously thought (Hasin, Goodwin, Stinson, & Grant, 2005; Merikangas, et al., 
2007; Merikangas & Pato, 2009), especially in clinical settings (Biederman, et al., 1996; 
Blader & Carlson, 2007; Geller, et al., 2002; Youngstrom, Youngstrom, & Starr, 2005). 
Further, a higher proportion of people with depression will actually have bipolar disorder, 
particularly child populations (Angst, Sellaro, Stassen, & Gamma, 2005). One likely clinical 
scenario of base rate neglect includes clinicians failing to assess for hypo/manic symptoms in 
youth with depression. The seriousness of base-rate neglect is also highlighted by recent 
FDA requirements: product information sheets for all antidepressants must include a 
recommendation for bipolar screening prior to prescription (see Warning section) (U.S. Food 
& Drug Administration, 2004; Akiskal & Benazzi, 2005).  
Challenge 2 – Symptom Overlap 
 Symptom overlap makes it difficult to parse apart symptoms of bipolar from other 
likely suspects in pediatric populations, namely attention-deficit hyperactivity disorder 
(ADHD), unipolar depression, and oppositional defiant disorder (ODD). Irritability lacks 
diagnostic specificity and can be used to support a large number of diagnoses) (Youngstrom, 
Findling, et al., 2005). For example, irritability can be a symptom of bipolar, ADHD, 
unipolar depression, and ODD. Semi-structured diagnostic interviews, such as the Kiddie 
Schedule for Affective Disorders and Schizophrenia (KSADS) (Kaufman, et al., 1997), 
which are used in research, can help clinicians parse apart symptoms; however, interviews 
like the KSADS are often impractical in clinical settings due to issues surrounding training, 
burden, and insurance reimbursement. In part, because real-world clinical settings have these 
types of barriers, thorough assessments of PBD are often not conducted. Consequently, 
clinicians are also vulnerable to diagnosis momentum: the tendency for a particular initial or 
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provisional diagnosis to become established without adequate evidence. Research lends 
support to the possibility that clinicians overestimate the likelihood of bipolar without 
adequate evidence (Dubicka, Carlson, Vail, & Harrington, 2008; Jenkins, et al., 2011). They 
may be framing this judgment quickly on the basis of a few features, and then fail to check 
whether a sufficient number of criteria are met. Similarly, once the bipolar hypothesis gains 
momentum, disconfirming evidence may be discounted or ignored.  
Challenge 3 – High Comorbidity 
 Evidence suggests that bipolar disorder is associated with ADHD, anxiety disorders, 
ODD, and conduct disorder (CD) (Biederman, et al., 1997; Biederman, et al., 2004; Geller, et 
al., 2000; Lewinsohn, Seeley, Buckley, & Klein, 2002; Moreno, et al., 2007; Youngstrom, 
Findling, et al., 2005). High comorbidity may also be problematic in clinicians’ assessment 
of PBD because some clinicians may not see a “typical” uncomplicated bipolar presentation 
(Biederman, Klein, Pine, & Klein, 1998; Youngstrom, Findling, et al., 2005). For example, 
individuals with bipolar have high rates of ADHD (Galanter & Leibenluft, 2008; Kessler, et 
al., 2006; Lewinsohn, Klein, & Seeley, 1995; Singh, DelBello, Kowatch, & Strakowski, 
2006). Table 2 provides an overview of the common symptoms between these two disorders 
while also highlighting important distinctions in symptom manifestation. As a result of 
overlapping symptomatology and higher comorbidity rates between bipolar disorder and 
ADHD, clinicians seem especially prone to commit search satisficing-- when one calls off a 
search once something is found (i.e., finding something may be satisfactory but not finding 
everything is suboptimal (see Croskerry, 2002)). In the case of PBD and ADHD, clinicians 
may “call off the search” when they diagnose one of these disorders, causing them to miss 
the other disorder for youths who actually meet DSM criteria for both conditions. Search 
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satisficing also probably contributes to the overdiagnosis of unipolar depression at the 
expense of bipolar disorder (Angst, 2004). Patients are more likely to seek help for symptoms 
of depression, and once clinicians decide that depression is present, they may call off the 
diagnostic search before checking for a history of hypomania or mania. 
Challenge 4 – Misdiagnosis of Minority Populations 
 Adult research on bipolar indicates that minority populations are frequently 
misdiagnosed (Kirov & Murray, 1999; Lawson, Hepler, Holladay, & Cuffel, 1994). 
Specifically, adult African American populations are at high risk of being misdiagnosed with 
schizophrenia (Davis & Jones, 1973; Flaskerud & Hu, 1992; Gross, Herbert, Knatterud, & 
Donner, 1969; Lawson, et al., 1994; Marquez, Taintor, & Schwartz, 1985; Mukherjee, 
Shukla, Woodle, Rosen, & Olarte, 1983; Neighbors, Jackson, Campbell, & Williams, 1989; 
Strakowski, Flaum, et al., 1996; Strakowski, et al., 1995; Strakowski, McElroy, Keck, & 
West, 1996; Strakowski, Shelton, & Kolbrener, 1993), and less likely than Caucasian patients 
to receive bipolar diagnoses even when all subjects present with psychotic mania 
(Strakowski, et al., 2003; Strakowski, McElroy, et al., 1996). There is also evidence 
suggesting that African American pediatric populations are more likely to receive diagnoses 
of conduct disorder or on the schizophrenia spectrum (DelBello, Lopez-Larson, Soutullo, & 
Strakowski, 2001; Fabrega, Ulrich, & Mezzich, 1993; Kilgus, Pumariega, & Cuffe, 1995). 
Currently, no research indicates that the risk of developing bipolar disorder varies by 
race/ethnicity (American Psychiatric Association, 2001; Van Meter, Moreira, & Youngstrom, 
2011). Nevertheless, clinicians may be prone to misdiagnose or inaccurately judged the 
likelihood of PBD in African American clients (Jenkins, et al., 2011). Clearly, more research 
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is needed to examine the influence of race/ethnicity bias in the clinical assessment of bipolar 
populations as well as methods for reducing this bias.  
Challenge 5 – Exaggerated Certainty 
 Studies examining clinicians’ ability to make appropriate confidence ratings, or rather 
their ability to specify when their predications are correct, have generated mixed results. 
Although there is substantial evidence suggesting that clinicians lack the ability to make 
appropriate confidence ratings (Goldberg, 1968; Mischel, 1996) and that judges tend to be 
overconfident (Kahneman & Tversky, 1973; Nisbett & Ross, 1980; Slovic, Fischhoff, & 
Lichtenstein, 1977), there is also research suggesting that this may not be the case, or that 
other factors such as clinical experience moderate the relationship between accuracy and 
confidence (see Garb, 1986, for a review). Given the evidence that PBD may be 
overdiagnosed frequently in the U.S. (Soutullo, et al., 2005), overconfidence--thinking one 
knows more than one does, often without having gathered sufficient information--is a serious 
concern that may impede accurate diagnostic decisions (e.g., Arkes 1981). In particular, 
overconfident judges may (a) fail to search for information that might cause them to revise 
their original predictions (Einhorn, 1980; Einhorn & Hogarth, 1978) and (b) disregard 
evidence contradicting their current judgments (Friedlander & Phillips, 1984; Koriat, 
Lichtenstein, & Fischhoff, 1980). More research is needed to better understand the role of 
clinician confidence in of the assessment of PBD.  
Cognitive De-Biasing Strategies and Mental Health 
 Despite substantial evidence suggesting that clinical judgment is prone to a host of 
errors and is inferior in many cases to statistical prediction methods (Aegisdottir, et al., 2006; 
Grove, et al., 2000; Spengler, et al., 2009), less research has examined methods for 
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addressing the cognitive pitfalls that contribute to the inadequacies associated with clinical 
judgment in mental health. The reduction of diagnostic error in medicine, however, has 
gained substantial attention in recent years. This may not be surprising given that diagnostic 
errors have a proportionately higher morbidity compared to other types of medical errors 
(Brennan, et al., 1991; Thomas, et al., 2000; Wilson, et al., 1995), and delayed or missed 
diagnoses account for approximately half of all litigation brought against physicians (Ohio 
Hospital Association & St. Paul Minnesota Insurance Company, 1998). In particular, 
cognitive de-biasing strategies have taken the forefront in recent medical research for 
reducing cognitive error. 
 Cognitive psychology experts recommend similar strategies to those used by experts 
in medical decision-making (e.g., Croskerry, 2003) for improving clinical judgment, such as 
consider the alternatives, think Bayesian, and decrease reliance on memory (Arkes, 1981). 
Each of these strategies will be discussed in more detail below. In general, there seems to be 
consensus across these fields, especially regarding the importance of focused professional 
training (Arkes, 1981; Croskerry, 2003). Arkes (1991) also shares that simply telling 
individuals about a particular bias and then telling them not to do it is an “absolutely 
worthless” technique (p. 326). Research supports the ineffectiveness of this approach 
(Fischoff, 1977; Kurtz & Garfield, 1978; Wood, 1978). Thus, in order to change clinician 
behavior a more concentrated approach seems warranted.  
 Although cognitive de-biasing strategies are relatively innovative for mental health 
practice in the sense that they are not formally organized or packaged as they are presently in 
medicine (see Croskerry 2003), the concept of educating and training mental health 
professionals in decision-making is not new and has been recommended by many experts 
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(e.g., Arkes, 1991; Fischhoff, 1982). For example, based on findings from a recent meta-
analysis on clinical judgment, study authors recommend that training incorporate statistical 
methods to decrease judgment biases and errors (Aegisdottir, et al., 2006). This is consistent 
with many others’ recommendations as well, including calls for increased education in 
regression formulas, cutoff scores, and hit rates (Anastasi & Urbina, 1982; Crocker & 
Algina, 1986). Further, there is evidence that training in probability theory and education on 
common heuristics increases judgment accuracy (Arkes, 1981, 1991a; Jenkins, et al., 2011; 
Nisbett & Ross, 1980; Spengler & Strohmer, 2001).  
 Table 3 provides an integrative list of proposed cognitive de-biasing strategies from 
the decision-making and cognitive psychology literatures along with definitions and 
examples of each strategy. A few of these strategies will be discussed in the following 
paragraphs with an emphasis on their generalizability to clinicians’ assessment of PBD. 
Develop Insight and Awareness 
 As discussed, the literature identifies common challenges associated with the 
assessment of PBD that likely account for the difficulty assessing bipolar and the frequency 
of misdiagnosis and overdiagnosis (Bowring & Kovacs, 1992; Youngstrom, Findling, et al., 
2005). Some of these challenges seem to map on to specific cognitive errors, including 
include base-rate neglect, diagnosis momentum, search satisficing, overconfidence bias, and 
race/ethnicity bias. Based on recommendations provided in the decision-making and 
cognitive psychology literatures, giving detailed descriptions and characterizations of these 
specific faulty heuristics and biases along with clinical examples of each demonstrating 
potential adverse effects on decision-making can be effective cognitive de-biasing strategies 
(Croskerry, 2003).  
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 For example, clinicians might learn that base-rate neglect refers to failing to 
adequately take into account the prevalence of a particular disease. Then, they might be 
educated about the base rate of bipolar disorder based on the most recent findings from 
epidemiological research (e.g., Van Meter et al., 2011). Finally, two clinical scenarios might 
be presented in which a clinician fails to assess for past symptoms of hypo/mania in a client 
with depression (i.e., an example of committing the cognitive error) whereas in the second 
scenario, the clinician inquires about past episodes of unusually energetic or irritable mood 
(i.e., an example of not committing base-rate neglect). Although there is some debate about 
the effectiveness of merely educating clinicians and increasing their awareness about faulty 
heuristics and biases (Croskerry, 2003; Gordon & Franklin, 2003), experts agree that 
increasing insight is an important ingredient of cognitive de-biasing (Fischhoff, 1982; 
Redelmeier, 2005). 
Consider Alternatives 
 Given both the high rates of comorbidity and the overlapping symptomatology of 
bipolar disorder and other psychiatric conditions, considering the alternatives or routinely 
contemplating differential diagnoses seems highly relevant. For example, if a youth presents 
with irritability and high energy, these symptoms might be a sign of a mood disorder or 
ADHD. Training clinicians to ask themselves, “What else might this be?” can reduce 
cognitive errors such as search satisficing and diagnosis momentum. Further, always making 
sure to consider the most common (i.e., high base rate) options in addition to the diagnoses 
that a clinician is currently considering can prevent base-rate neglect. This strategy may help 
reduce the rate of “missed” diagnoses as well as lead to more accurate diagnostic decisions 
by decreasing the likelihood of misdiagnosis.  
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Decrease Reliance on Memory 
 Research indicates that for a number of reasons, relying on one’s memory can 
threaten judgment accuracy (Arkes & Harkness, 1980; Lueger & Petzel, 1979a; Ward & 
Jenkins, 1965). For example, Arkes & Harkness (1980) found that individuals recalled 
symptoms consistent with a given diagnosis even when these symptoms were not present. 
Mnemonics, algorithms, and clinical practice guidelines (to name a few) have been suggested 
as mechanisms for decreasing reliance on memory and increasing judgment accuracy. A few 
mnemonics have been identified in the literature on PBD (Kowatch, et al., 2005; Quinn & 
Fristad, 2004; Youngstrom, et al., 2009). For example, “GRAPES” is a mnemonic for more 
specific symptoms of bipolar including: grandiosity; racing thoughts; increased goal directed 
activity; pressured speech; elated, euphoric mood; and, decreased need for sleep. 
Additionally, “FIND” is a mnemonic for assessing the frequency, intensity, number, and 
duration of bipolar symptoms. Training clinicians how to use these mnemonics can assist 
with symptom recognition as well as clinical interviewing (especially in time-limited 
situations when a gold standard assessment such as the KSADS is not feasible).  
Specific Training on Bayesian Thinking 
 Bayesian probability theory is a highly endorsed strategy for overcoming flaws and 
biases in thinking (Aegisdottir, et al., 2006; Arkes, 1981; Croskerry, 2003; Guyatt & Rennie, 
2002; Straus, Glasziou, Richardson & Haynes, 2005; Youngstrom, et al., 2009). Training 
clinicians in Bayesian thinking or actuarial decision-making might consist of education on 
diagnostic likelihood ratios (DLRs) and how to correctly synthesize risk information. In the 
case of PBD, this process might entail learning the base rate of bipolar at one’s clinical 
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setting and learning how to combine this information with family history and/or test score 
information. This method will be discussed in more detail below.  
Addressing the Issue of Inaccurate Judgments 
 Although there seem to be advantages of training clinicians in decision-making 
strategies (Berven, 1985; Berven & Scofield, 1980; Falvey & Hebert, 1992; Kurpius, 
Benjamin, & Morran, 1985; Spengler & Strohmer, 2001), more research is needed to identify 
effective ways to teach students and professionals how to avoid cognitive pitfalls (Regehr & 
Norman, 1996). Graber (2002) argues that diagnostic error may never be eradicated, but that 
it may be significantly reduced by specific training aimed at improving cognition and 
cognitive awareness. Overall, clinical decision-making could benefit from more reliable and 
valid clinical judgment; however, strategies or interventions for minimizing cognitive errors 
in mental health, particularly around diagnostic decisions, remain largely unexplored- 
especially strategies that have been tested under rigorous experimental conditions.  
What We Do Know: Making Bayesian Thinking Easier for Clinicians 
 One de-biasing strategy recommended for helping professionals reduce cognitive 
error is specific training in fundamental rules of probability and basic Bayesian probability 
theory (Croskerry, 2003). At present, many common assessment methods in mental health 
are not empirically supported (as reviewed in Fletcher, Francis, Morris, & Lyon, 2005; 
Neisworth & Bagnato, 2004); and those widely used techniques with evidence also have 
substantial shortcomings. Inter-rater reliability among clinicians conducting unstructured 
interviews has been shown to be inadequate (Piacentini, et al., 1993), and there is only 
moderate agreement between diagnoses based on standardized research interviews and those 
based on clinical chart reviews (Ezpeleta, et al., 1997; Lewczyk, Garland, Hurlburt, Gearity, 
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& Hough, 2003; Rettew, Lynch, Achenbach, Dumenci, & Ivanova, 2009; Vitiello, Malone, 
Buschle, Delaney, & Behar, 1990; Vitiello & Stoff, 1997). To address shortcomings of 
current assessment methods, researchers have begun testing the effectiveness of actuarial 
approaches (Jenkins, et al., 2012) that are consistent with recommendations by Croskerry 
(2003) and others to provide clinicians specific training in Bayesian reasoning  (Arkes, 1981; 
Youngstrom, et al., 2009). 
 In contrast to traditional clinical assessment, Bayesian reasoning or actuarial 
approaches employ mathematical and statistical methods to assess risk of illness. Actuarial 
decision-making has most commonly been used in the medical community to assess the 
likelihood of illness such as cancer; however, two recent meta-analyses lend support to 
statistical prediction methodologies in mental health (Aegisdottir, et al., 2006; Grove, et al., 
2000). A recent study indicates that actuarial approaches can be used in psychological 
assessment to improve assessment accuracy and increase agreement surrounding diagnostic 
decisions for suspected bipolar disorder (Jenkins, et al., 2011).  
 The nomogram is a simple, practical method for combining information about risk 
with “likelihood ratios” associated with test results or other clinical findings (Jaeschke, 
Guyatt, & Sackett, 1994). Clinicians can work directly with probabilities without requiring 
any mathematical computation (Youngstrom & Duax, 2005). Specifically, the nomogram 
operates as a type of slide rule (see Appendix A). The nomogram approach correctly 
combines three pieces of information (i.e., base rate, familial risk, and test score) into 
consistent (less spread in opinion), unbiased (neither systematically over- or under-
estimating risk), and efficient (using a parsimonious amount of information to arrive at the 
estimate) estimates (Youngstrom et al., 2009; Youngstrom & Duax, 2005). This estimate, a 
19 
 
Bayesian posterior probability, can be used to determine the likelihood that a youth has PBD, 
and to guide next steps in assessment and treatment (Youngstrom, et al., 2009).  
 An alternative to the probability nomogram is to use actuarial tables. Tables are 
familiar, can be user-friendly, and arguably require less cognitive resources compared to the 
nomogram. However, tables would need to be recalculated and replaced to accommodate 
each scientific advance such as new base rate estimates or updates about the diagnostic 
performance of measures. Mental health professionals could potentially access actuarial 
tables to determine patient risk immediately based on their clinical setting and a patient’s test 
score and/or family history of bipolar illness. Table 4 provides an example of an actuarial 
table that mental health professionals might use. Overall, training clinicians in actuarial 
decision-making with convenient tools such as the nomogram or actuarial tables is not only 
consistent with recommendations in the de-biasing literature but is also gaining recognition 
in the mental health field as an evidenced-based approach (Chorpita, Yim, & Tracey, 2002; 
Jenkins, et al., 2011; Youngstrom, et al., 2009). 
Evidence-Based Practice and Heuristics 
 Research suggests that people with severe mental illness seldom receive effective 
services in community mental health centers (Lehman & Steinwachs, 1998; U.S. Department 
of Health, 1999; Wang, Demler, & Kessler, 2002; West, et al., 2005). To address this issue, 
evidence-based practice in psychology (EBPP) promotes effective psychological practice and 
enhancing public health via empirically supported principles of assessment (American 
Psychological, 2002; Sackett, Rosenberg, Muir Gray, Haynes, & Richardson, 1996). At 
present, EBPP remains largely theoretical and hortatory. Several mental health initiatives 
acknowledge that more effective approaches could be implemented in care (Ganju, 2006; 
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Institute of Medicine, 2001), yet the research-practice gap persists. Any number of reasons 
may explain the practice-research gap. For instance, clinicians can feel overwhelmed by the 
literature and elect not to use it for clinical issues (Haynes, Glasziou, & Straus, 2000). This is 
problematic: in one study, consulting the literature changed the medicine, diagnostic test, or 
prognostic information given to the patient in 47% of cases (Crowley, et al., 2003). 
 The role of clinical judgment in EBPP has been a contentious issue between 
researchers and clinicians. For instance, a common critique of EBPP by clinicians involves a 
belief that evidence-based treatments restrict or deemphasize the importance or role of a 
clinician and his/her judgment in patient care (Addis & Krasnow, 2000; Addis, Wade, & 
Hatgis, 1999). The Report of the 2005 Presidential Task Force on Evidence-Based Practice 
argues that although cognitive errors can negatively impact clinical decision-making, clinical 
judgment is also responsible for complex decisions that can lead to well-conceptualized 
EBPP (Levant, 2005). Thus, it appears that improving clinical judgment may also help 
facilitate EBPP. Moreover, it is possible that training clinicians in decision-making (i.e., to 
improve clinical judgment) in tandem with training on or dissemination of evidence-based 
treatments may help validate the importance of clinical judgment, defusing clinician 
resistance and leading to more positive attitudes toward EBPP.   
 One way to prevent furthering the practice-research gap is to involve providers in 
earlier stages of research (i.e., prior to dissemination). For example, in contrast to the more 
common and sequential approach of first developing protocols and then examining how they 
translate into practice, researchers can be proactive and concurrently request feedback from 
clinicians while developing new interventions. Involving providers in all stages of EBPP 
research is a model that other prominent researchers are already adopting (Garland, 
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Plemmons, & Koontz, 2006). Getting clinicians’ feedback early in the process by providing 
them the opportunity to share their concerns and voice their preferences seems pivotal to 
successful implementation. Learning from clinicians on the front line about potential barriers 
that might otherwise go undetected can also allow researchers the opportunity to tailor 
strategies to maximize utility. 
Significance and Broader Impact 
 Among many consequences, research shows that inaccurate decisions can lead to 
treatment failure and premature dropout (Epperson, Bushway, & Warman, 1983; Lutz, et al., 
2006). Evidence also suggests that accurate diagnostic assessment is important for providing 
effective interventions (Meyers, et al., 1998). In the case of bipolar disorder, delays in 
diagnosis carry serious consequences for patients, their caregivers, and society, including 
high rates of suicide and increased economic burden (Dunner, 2003; Stang, et al., 2006). 
Correct diagnosis is pivotal to starting appropriate medication and treatment (e.g., mood 
stabilizers versus antidepressant medication, which may worsen outcome; cf. Joseph et. al, 
2009). 
 Redelmeier (2005) recommends that instead of attempting to completely eliminate 
cognitive shortcuts (which often serve clinicians well), increasing awareness of common 
errors could improve patient care. Awareness alone may not be enough. Aegisdottir & 
colleagues (2006) recommend developing and testing more user-friendly heuristics for use in 
clinical settings to further aid judgment accuracy and to save time. Increasing the accuracy of 
clinical judgment by targeting specific deficits and equipping clinicians with effective 
decision aids (e.g., mnemonics, the nomogram), could greatly improve clinical decision-
making and enhance the quality of clinical practice. PBD represents an opportunity to make 
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considerable public health contributions due to the combination of rapidly increasing 
diagnosis combined with the currently low accuracy of diagnostic decisions.  
 Overall, the literature on error in psychiatry is relatively small (Grasso, Rothschild, 
Genest, & Bates, 2003) with only a few studies having investigated the incidence, nature, 
predictors, and prevention of errors that may occur in mental health settings (Nath & Marcus, 
2006). Yet, implications of failed cognitive shortcuts have dire consequences for patient care. 
Increasing knowledge about interventions to increase awareness and reduce faulty heuristics 
and biases can accomplish multiple goals, including: (a) improved education and training 
around assessing bipolar and potentially other disorders; (b) development of effective 
cognitive de-biasing strategies; and, (c) advancement of the extant literature on clinical 
decision-making for mental health (Croskerry, 2002). The study aims focused on these goals.  
Study and Hypotheses         
 Can training in cognitive de-biasing strategies increase judgment accuracy in the 
assessment of bipolar disorder? The proposed study explored the following primary aim: To 
test the efficacy of a new intervention designed to improve clinical judgment in the 
assessment of pediatric bipolar disorder by educating participants in common cognitive 
pitfalls and training them in recommended de-biasing strategies. In addition to examining the 
influence of this intervention on decreasing the likelihood of several decision-making errors 
such as base-rate neglect, search satisficing, and diagnosis momentum, we also investigated 
the relationship between clinician confidence and judgment accuracy as well as the practice 
implications of decision-making errors and participants’ attitudes toward the intervention and 
vignette study. 
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Hypotheses  
 1.0 Overall diagnostic accuracy. Participants’ judgments in the treatment group 
will show higher decision accuracy than participants’ judgments in the control condition. 
Overall diagnostic accuracy will be a composite measure of participants’ judgments about 
diagnosis across case vignettes as well as the probability of disorder for one vignette. 
Participants’ diagnostic judgments in both groups will be coded as inaccurate, somewhat 
accurate, or accurate based on expert consensus. Risk of disorder will also be coded similarly 
as inaccurate, somewhat accurate, or accurate compared to the Bayesian posterior 
probability. Somewhat accurate risk estimates will fall within a range of ± 5% of the 
Bayesian estimates (Sedlmeier & Gigerenzer, 2001) whereas accurate estimates will be the 
exact estimate. After all of these decisions are coded for accuracy, they will be compared 
between the treatment and control groups.  
 1.1 Base Rate Neglect. Participants in the treatment group are less likely to make 
decisions consistent with base rate neglect, as demonstrated by their inclusion of bipolar 
disorder as a probable diagnosis. We predict that without cognitive de-biasing training, 
clinicians will not routinely assess for hypomania or mania. This pattern of decision-making 
would be consistent with findings in the literature that suggest delays in diagnosis 
(Hirschfeld, et al., 2003; Marchand, et al., 2006), as well as the possibility of underdiagnosis 
of bipolar disorder (Angst, 2007).  
1.2 Search Satisficing. Participants in the control condition will be more likely to 
engage in search satisficing than participants in the treatment condition, resulting in 
suboptimal diagnostic decisions. Given the high rates of comorbidity of bipolar disorder and 
other diagnoses--such as ADHD, which shares symptoms of bipolar--we anticipate that 
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clinicians may stop after diagnosing one disorder when the youth may actually meet criteria 
for multiple psychiatric conditions. Educating clinicians about this tendency and training 
them in how to conduct a more comprehensive assessment (i.e., similar to the proposed 
intervention) will result in a decreased likelihood of search satisficing. Participants in the 
treatment condition will be more likely to make sensitive diagnostic decisions, accounting for 
symptoms of both ADHD and PBD in their probable diagnoses.  
 1.3 Diagnosis momentum. Participants in the treatment group will generate more 
accurate estimates of the probability of bipolar disorder than participants in the control group. 
Typical clinical decision-making becomes self-reinforcing, with information that contradicts 
the initial impression de-emphasized, and corroborating information counting more. 
Participants in the treatment condition may correct for this tendency. In contrast, participants 
in the control condition will be more likely to endorse higher probabilities of PBD without 
adequate supporting evidence. 
 1.4 Race/ethnicity bias. Participants’ diagnoses in the treatment group will not be 
affected by youths’ race/ethnicity status. Given the tendency for clinicians to misdiagnose 
African-American youths with conduct disorder or schizophrenia, clinicians’ rates of bipolar 
diagnoses in the control condition will vary by youths’ race/ethnicity status, all other case 
information held constant. We hypothesize that educating clinicians that Caucasian and 
African American children are equally likely to have bipolar disorder (i.e., to date no 
research shows variation in diagnostic rates of bipolar across racial and ethnic groups 
(American Psychiatric Association, 2001; Grant, et al., 2005; Jonas, Brody, Roper, & 
Narrow, 2003; Kessler, et al., 2005), will lead to more accurate diagnoses. Therefore, we 
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anticipate that participants’ diagnoses in the treatment group will be significantly less 
influenced by a youth’s race/ethnicity.    
 1.5   Confidence and Judgment Validity. There are mixed findings regarding the 
relationship between judgment accuracy and clinical confidence (see literature review). To 
further explore this relationship, we hypothesize that for participants in the present study, the 
discrepancy between accuracy and confidence will be significantly different depending on 
group status. Specifically, participants in the treatment group who learn de-biasing strategies 
are expected to demonstrate better agreement between accuracy and confidence. Participants 
in the control condition are more likely to show overconfidence bias as demonstrated by 
discrepancies between accuracy and confidence in which the accuracy of their judgments is 
less than their confidence ratings.  
 1.6  Decision-Making Errors and Practice Implications. The effect or clinical 
implications of base rate neglect, search satisficing, diagnosis momentum, overconfidence 
bias, and race/ethnicity bias will also be examined. We predict that the presence of a faulty 
heuristic/bias (as demonstrated by inaccurate diagnoses or only somewhat accurate 
diagnoses) will affect clinicians’ decisions regarding next clinical action, suggesting that 
heuristics change treatment as well as assessment formulations.  
 1.7 Clinician Experience of the Vignette Exercise. The cognitive de-biasing 
intervention will help participants in the treatment group feel more prepared for the case 
vignette exercise. As a result, they will more likely to rate their experience of reading case 
vignettes and responding to questions as more favorable than participants who do not receive 
the intervention.  
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 1.8 Clinician Attitudes toward the Intervention. Clinicians who receive the 
intervention will find it helpful and informative. 
 In addition, we will explore whether clinicians’ perceived ability to perform various 
mathematical tasks and preference for the use of numerical versus prose information relates 
to (a) the accuracy of their decisions on specific vignettes, or (b) their attitudes toward the 
intervention. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
METHOD 
 
Overview 
  
 In the current study, a randomized controlled trial (RCT) tested the efficacy of a new 
intervention designed to improve decision accuracy. Study participants were randomly 
assigned to one of two conditions, the treatment or control group. The randomization process 
is discussed in more detail below. Participants in both groups received information about 
mood disorders via a 5 minute pre-recorded presentation, and instructed to read several case 
vignettes and respond to a series of questions after each vignette regarding judgments about 
probable diagnoses, next clinical actions, and/or decision confidence. Participants in the 
treatment group also received a training (20 minutes) on decision-making errors and 
cognitive de-biasing strategies for assessing PBD (hereafter referred to as the cognitive de-
biasing intervention) prior to responding to the case vignette exercise.  
Participants 
 Participants were 79 mental health providers with 32 participants in the treatment 
group and 47 in the control group. Study recruitment consisted of providing study fliers and 
making study announcements via listservs (e.g., North Carolina Psychological Association) 
as well as electronic mail (e.g., contacting training directors, chief psychologists, trainees). 
Table 7 provides information about participant demographics including participants’ age, 
race/ethnicity, and current geographic location. Table 8 provides information about 
participants’ professional backgrounds including professional title, licensure status, and years 
of clinical experience. Table 9 contains information regarding participants’ current caseload 
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including the ages and diagnostic groups of participants’ primary patient populations. The 
treatment and control groups evidenced no significant differences, p > .05, or significant 
associations, p > .05, on any demographic, professional, or patient variables.  
Procedure  
 Study administration was Web-based using Qualtrics, a provider of online survey 
software solutions, and an automated Powerpoint presentation with narration. Clinicians 
accessed the study through a Web address. When individuals entered the website, they were 
thanked for their interest in the study and were requested to answer two questions to 
determine study eligibility. In order to be eligible to participate, clinicians needed to be: (a) 
licensed or currently supervised by a licensed mental health professional; and, (b) have 
experience treating child and adolescent patient populations for mental health issues. If 
participants respond “no” to either of these screening questions, they were thanked for their 
interest and informed that they were not eligible to participate, thus ending the survey.  
 Clinicians who responded “yes” to both screening questions were informed of their 
eligibility to participate and they were directed to the study informed consent page. 
Individuals who chose not to participate either closed the browser window or clicked a box 
indicating that they did not want to participate in which case they were thanked for their 
interest in the study and exited from the survey. Individuals who reviewed the consent form 
and wanted to participate clicked a box to indicate agreement to participate in the present 
study. 
 After providing informed consent, we asked participants to complete a demographic 
and background questionnaire (see Appendix B for a copy of the questionnaire). On this 
questionnaire and throughout the rest of the study, participants were not forced to answer any 
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question that they intentionally wanted to leave unanswered. Instead, Qualtrics has a feature 
that requested a response for any unanswered items (to help prevent participants from 
unintentionally skipping items).  
 Following the demographic and background questionnaire, we programmed Qualtrics 
to randomly present participants with one of two possible URLs. Participants clicked on this 
link, taking them to a new window in which they either watched a brief presentation on mood 
disorders (i.e., control condition) or a brief presentation on mood disorders + the cognitive 
de-biasing intervention (i.e., treatment condition). At the end of both presentations, 
participants returned to Qualtrics and continued on to the case vignette exercises.  
 We informed participants that they would be presented with four case vignettes and 
asked to read each vignette and respond to the questions that followed. We used only four 
vignettes to reduce the burden on participants and to maximize response rate. Qualtrics was 
programmed to present case vignettes to participants in a random order. More information 
about study vignettes is provided below. After completing the last vignette and 
corresponding questions, we asked all participants to rate their experience of participating in 
the vignette exercise (see Appendix C for a copy of the questionnaire). Participants in the 
treatment group were also asked to complete a brief questionnaire about their attitudes 
toward the cognitive de-biasing intervention (see Appendix D for a copy of the 
questionnaire). After completing their respective attitude questionnaires, all participants 
completed the Subject Numeracy Scale (Fagerlin, et al., 2007). This scale is described below; 
see Appendix G for a copy of the questionnaire items.  
 After completing their participation in the study, we provided participants a link in 
Qualtrics to a separate Qualtrics database where participants provided their email addresses 
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and selected their preferred gift card. They could choose from Target, iTunes, or Amazon. 
We used two Qualtrics databases to ensure that participants’ responses were kept separate 
from their email addresses. As noted, participants earned a $20 gift card for their time and 
effort. We also offered to provide all participants in the control condition a copy of the 
cognitive de-biasing intervention. Participants were thanked for their participation in this 
one-time online study.  
 Randomization process. Two variables were randomized using Qualtrics software 
including the treatment condition and the race/ethnicity of vignette characters. As described 
earlier, we programmed Qualtrics to randomly assign participants to either the control (i.e., 
presentation on introduction to mood disorders only) or treatment condition (i.e., presentation 
on introduction to mood disorders + cognitive de-biasing intervention) by randomly 
presenting them with different website links. Qualtrics also randomized different versions of 
vignettes so that the different vignette characters were African American half of the time and 
Caucasian half of the time, all other case information identical. Also, the case vignettes were 
presented in random order to participants as well as the questions on the multiple choice test 
for the overconfidence vignette (see below). 
Study Materials  
 Intervention. Table 5 provides an overview of the didactic materials included in the 
cognitive de-biasing intervention that was administered to participants in the treatment 
condition. The intervention consisted of two main parts: The first part provided education 
about common cognitive pitfalls; and, the second part provided training and tools to avoid 
cognitive pitfalls when assessing for PBD. 
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 Case vignettes. We crafted vignettes to examine specific decision-making errors. 
Study procedures varied slightly by case vignette in order to uniquely test for the specific 
decision-making error of interest. See Table 6 for an overview of the case vignettes and 
related procedures. For the vignettes testing for base-rate neglect and search satisficing, 
participants were instructed to read the case vignette and then: (i) make a determination of 
probable diagnosis; and, (ii) recommend next clinical action from a list of five options (e.g., 
more assessment; if yes, specify), psychotherapy or refer for psychotherapy (if yes, what 
type), medication or refer for medication (if yes, what type), no offer of treatment, or “other” 
(if yes, specify what “other” treatment do you recommend). Participants could select a 
maximum of two initial treatment methods (see methods from Currin et al., 2007). Note: 
Vignette instructions and questions for the vignettes testing for diagnosis momentum and 
overconfidence included additional questions; we present these additional instructions below 
with the actual vignette description. Brief descriptions and content of all case vignettes are 
also provided below. See Appendix E for a copy of each vignette. 
 Base rate neglect vignette. This vignette described a youth with current symptoms 
characteristic of a major depressive episode.  
 Search satisficing vignette. This vignette describes a youth with bipolar and 
attention-deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) symptoms. 
 Diagnosis momentum vignette. This vignette portrays a youth with bipolar 
symptoms, a moderately highly elevated test score on widely used assessment instrument, 
and a family history of bipolar. The vignette resembles the case vignette used in Jenkins et al. 
(2011).  
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 For this vignette, we asked participants to: (i) make a determination of probable 
diagnosis; (ii) recommend next clinical action from a list of five options (e.g., more 
assessment; if yes, specify), psychotherapy or refer for psychotherapy (if yes, what type?), 
medication or refer for medication (if yes, what type), no offer of treatment, or “other” (if 
yes, what “other” treatment do you recommend?); and, (iii) report the probability of a bipolar 
diagnosis (from 0 to 100) on the basis of the available case information.  
 Overconfidence. This vignette focused on a youth, Lynda, with classic symptoms of 
mania including grandiosity, hypersexuality as an example of disinhibited and risky 
behavior, psychomotor agitation, and distractibility – meeting criteria for at least four “B 
Criterion” symptoms in addition to the episodic disturbance of mood. Consistent with the 
episodic nature of mood disorders, her symptoms are described as intermittent. Lynda met 
duration criteria for a manic episode (e.g., 1 week or longer), and experienced impairment as 
a result of her symptoms.  
 This vignette was similar to those in Dubicka et al. (2008) (we received permission 
from study authors to use this vignette). For information regarding the assembly of the case 
vignette, see Dubicka et al. (2008). Similar to other vignettes, we asked participants to: (i) 
make a determination of probable diagnosis; and, (ii) recommend next clinical action from a 
list of five options (e.g., more assessment; if yes, specify), psychotherapy or refer for 
psychotherapy (if yes, what type), medication or refer for medication (if yes, what type), no 
offer of treatment, or “other” (if yes, what “other” treatment do you recommend). And, 
different from other vignettes, we also gave participants additional instructions, similar to 
procedures used in Oskamp (1965) and Adams (1957). Specifically, participants were asked 
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to make confidence judgments. This process is described in more detail in the following 
paragraphs.  
 In order to have a basis for determining the accuracy of the judgments, we 
constructed a multiple-choice case-study test. We asked participants to respond to 5 multiple 
choice questions about the vignette character’s presenting problem, symptoms, and 
diagnosis. See Appendix F for a copy of the questions. Per recommendations by Oskamp 
(1965), items were constructed only where there was fairly objective criterion information 
presented in the case. The incorrect alternatives for each item were constructed in such a way 
as to be clearly wrong, based on the published case material, but to be otherwise convincing 
and "seductive" alternatives. None of the items had their answers contained in the 
summarized case material; instead, participants were expected to follow the usual procedure 
in clinical judgment (McArthur, 1954) by forming a diagnostic picture of the youth from the 
material presented and then imputing her symptoms from their case formulation of the youth.  
 For each question of the multiple-choice case-study test, we asked participants to 
provide a confidence judgment. In other words, we asked them to rate their confidence in the 
correctness of their response from 0 to 100%. Confidence judgments were made using 
Adams (1957) confidence scale. According to this scale, confidence is defined in terms of 
expected percentage of correct decisions. Thus, of those responses made with confidence p, 
about p% should be correct. This scale has the advantage of facilitating a direct comparison 
between the level of accuracy and the level of confidence. For example, if a participant 
responded to 30% of the items correct and had an average confidence level of 85%, he/she 
demonstrated overconfidence.   
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Measures 
 Independent variables.  
 Demographic and background information. We gathered the following demographic 
and background information from all study participants (see procedures above): age; gender; 
race/ethnicity; years of clinical experience; clinical setting; theoretical orientation(s); typical 
client caseloads; and, training in evidence-based practices. See Appendix B for complete 
information collected.  
 Treatment condition. Participants in the treatment condition received the cognitive 
de-biasing intervention (as described previously) whereas participants in the control 
condition did not. Participants in both groups received the same brief introduction to mood 
disorders.   
 Race/ethnicity. Vignette characters were experimentally manipulated so that the 
youths in each of the vignettes were African American half of the time and Caucasian the 
other half of the time.  
 Dependent variables. 
 Decision accuracy. Several methods for defining judgment accuracy exist in the 
literature (see Spengler, 2009). The present study employed dependent measures of high 
criterion validity. Examples of highly valid criteria include extensive a priori validation of 
written clinical vignettes (e.g., Spengler, Strohmer, et al., 1990) as well as post hoc 
manipulation checks of clinical vignettes (e.g., Goldsmith & Schloss, 1986). To help assess 
the accuracy of participants’ decision-making, dependent measures included: (a) diagnostic 
accuracy (per vignette), (b) decision-making error status (per vignette and overall), (c) risk 
estimate accuracy (for the diagnosis momentum vignette only), (d) overall diagnostic 
35 
 
accuracy (i.e., a composite measure of (a) and (b) above); and, (e) confidence judgment 
accuracy (i.e., for the overconfidence vignette only). 
 Diagnostic accuracy. We asked participants to report the youth’s probable diagnoses 
after reading each vignette. These diagnoses were rated on a 3-point Likert scale of (1 = 
inaccurate diagnosis, 2 = somewhat accurate, and 3 = accurate diagnosis) using criteria 
established by the research team (which includes expert diagnosticians). In addition to 
selecting the most probable diagnosis, participants were able to indicate other diagnoses that 
they were considering. 
 Decision-making error status. Responses that earned “inaccurate” and “somewhat 
accurate” scores on diagnostic accuracy (see above) were classified as committing a 
decision-making error; “accurate” responses indicated no decision-making error.  
 Risk estimate accuracy. For the vignette testing diagnosis momentum, participants’ 
estimates were compared to an objective, actuarial estimate--the Bayesian posterior 
probability of the likelihood of bipolar disorder. The Bayesian approach is described in detail 
in several peer-reviewed manuscripts (see Jenkins et al., 2011; Youngstrom & Duax, 2005; 
Youngstrom, Freeman, & Jenkins, 2009). For this vignette, the true risk estimate was 27% 
(±5%) based on: clinic setting (e.g., the youth was seen in outpatient clinic, so the starting 
base rate of PBD is 6%); family history information (e.g., the youth had a second degree 
relative with bipolar disorder increasing the odds of a bipolar diagnosis by a factor of 2.5), 
and a test score of 35 on the PGBI (which is associated with a DLR of 2.3) (Youngstrom, et 
al., 2004). Participant responses were rated on a 3-point Likert scale of (1 = inaccurate 
diagnosis, 2 = somewhat accurate, and 3 = accurate diagnosis). A 3-point response was 27%, 
a 2-point response fell within ±5% of the true estimate (from 22 to 32) (Sedlmeier & 
36 
 
Gigerenzer, 2001), and a 1-point response fell outside of a ±5% range (less than 22 or greater 
than 32).  
 Overall diagnostic accuracy.  Overall diagnostic accuracy was a composite measure 
of diagnostic accuracy and risk estimate accuracy across all of the case vignettes. This 
variable serves as a primary outcome measure. 
 Confidence judgments. The confidence judgments were made using a scale devised 
by Adams (1957) that defines confidence in terms of expected percentage of correct 
decisions. In addition to providing a clearly understood objective meaning for confidence, 
this scale had the advantage of allowing a direct comparison between the level of accuracy 
and the level of confidence (Oskamp, 1965). The discrepancy between participants’ percent 
accurate and percent confident (i.e., the difference score) was the dependent variable that we 
examined across treatment and control groups.  
 Subjective Numeracy Scale. The Subjective Numeracy Scale (SNS) is an 8-item self-
report measure that assessed respondents’ perceived ability to perform various mathematical 
tasks as well as their preference for numerical versus prose information 2. It required no 
mathematical computations and had no correct answers. Four questions asked respondents 
about their numerical ability in different settings, and four questions inquired about 
respondents’ preferences for the presentation of numerical and probabilistic information. The 
SNS is both reliable and highly correlated with the Lipkus, Samsa & Rimer (2001) numeracy 
measure (Fagerlin et al., 2007). See Appendix G for a copy of the measure.  
 Clinician attitudes toward the vignette exercise. All participants completed a brief 
attitude questionnaire about their experience completing the case vignette exercise. See 
Appendix C for a copy of the questionnaire items. This measure described different aspects 
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of the vignette exercise (e.g., how challenging it was to make diagnostic decisions), and 
required participants to make ratings on a 6-point scale: (1) strong agree; (2) agree; (3) 
somewhat agree; (4) somewhat disagree; (5) disagree; and, (6) strong disagree. 
 Clinician attitudes toward the intervention. Participants in the treatment group 
completed a brief questionnaire (4 items) about their attitudes toward the cognitive de-
biasing intervention. See Appendix D for a copy of the questionnaire items. This measure 
described different aspects of the intervention (e.g., how helpful it was in making diagnostic 
decisions), and required participants to make ratings on a 6-point scale: (1) strong agree; (2) 
agree; (3) somewhat agree; (4) somewhat disagree; (5) disagree; and, (6) strong disagree. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
RESULTS 
 
Power Analyses 
  
 Power is the probability that the analysis will reject the null hypothesis when indeed it 
should be rejected. There was adequate power to detect effects for all primary analyses. A 
sensitivity analysis was run for the Logistic regression, Polytomous Universal Model 
(PLUM) regression, Multiple Linear regression, Analysis of Covariance (ANCOVA), t-test, 
and Chi-Square tests.  
 Logistic regression modeled the likelihood of decision-making errors for each 
vignette. Specifically, one goal of the proposed study was to test the null hypothesis that the 
event rate is identical in the treatment and control groups; or, equivalently, the odds ratio is 
1.0, the log odds ratio (beta) is 0.0, and the relative risk of making a diagnostic error is 1.0. 
Power was computed to reject the null under the following alternate hypothesis. Based on the 
sample size, power was adequate (80% or higher) for relative risks of 2.8 or larger. For 
example, for the control group, the rate of diagnostic errors might be 0.50 or higher, and for 
the training group the error rate would be 0.18 or lower. The study included a total of 79 
participants, assigned as follows: 60% to the control and 40% to the training group. The 
criterion for significance (alpha) was set at 0.05.  The test is 2-tailed, which means that an 
effect in either direction would be interpreted. For this distribution, effect size (event rates 
of 0.50, 0.18), sample size (79), and alpha (0.05, 2-tailed), power was 80%. This means that 
80% of studies would be expected to yield a significant effect, rejecting the null hypothesis 
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that the event rates are identical (Borenstein, Hedges, Rothstein, Cohen, & Schoenfeld, 
2010).        
 PLUM regression modeled diagnostic accuracy for each vignette. Current power 
analysis programs do not include PLUM regression in their power calculations. The 
sensitivity analysis for the PLUM regression is an approximation based on the logistic 
regression: 80% power to reject the null hypothesis given effect size, sample size (79), and 
alpha (0.05, 2-tailed). Notably, using logistic regression as an approximation is an 
underestimation of power (Hsieh, Bloch, & Larsen, 1998). 
 While logistic regression and PLUM regression tested participants’ performance on 
the individual vignettes, Multiple Linear regression (MLR) tested participants’ overall 
performance both in terms of the total number of decision-making errors committed and the 
sum accuracy of diagnostic decisions across all vignettes. For the MLR, we had 80% power 
to detect effect sizes of f2=.10 or larger (Cohen, 1988) for the given sample size (N = 79) and 
alpha = .05, 2-tailed) (Faul, Erdfelder, Buchner, & Lang, 2009). Cohen described effect sizes 
of f2 ~.02 as “small,” .15 as “medium,” and .35 as “large.”  
  ANCOVA compared differences in Bayesian estimates, clinician confidence, and 
attitudes toward the vignette exercise across the treatment and control groups. The power 
sensitivity analysis indicated that we had 80% power to detect a medium effect size (f = .32) 
(Cohen, 1988) for the given sample size (N = 78) and alpha (.05, 2-tailed). Cohen suggested 
benchmarks of f ~.10 as “small,” .25 as “medium,” and .40 as “large.”  
 Next, t-tests compared the treatment and control group on continuous scores. Based 
on the number of participants, we had 80% power to detect effect sizes of d=.65 or larger 
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(Cohen, 1988) for the given sample size (N = 78) and alpha = .05, 2-tailed), corresponding to 
somewhere between a medium (d ~.5) and large (d ~.8) effect. 
 Lastly, chi-square tests examined the association between decision-making error and 
practice implications. Results from this sensitivity analysis (based on the chi-square test with 
the highest number of degrees of freedom which was 5) indicated that we had 80% power to 
detect a critical χ2 = 12.59 for the given sample size (n = 78) and alpha (.05, 2-tailed). 
Quantitative Preliminary Analyses 
  Prior to quantitative analyses, data were screened to ensure quality and to check 
standard statistical assumptions. Given that the amount of missing data was small (<2%), 
missing data were excluded listwise. This approach provides less bias than pairwise deletion 
and is adequately suited for small amounts of missing data (Allison, 2002). There was only 
missing data for one participant. Therefore, we did not need to create dummy codes to 
indicate the presence or absence of data and run correlations between missing data indicators 
and variables to examine for evidence of patterns or associations with relevant variables. We 
performed statistical analyses with standard software packages—IBM Statistical Package for 
the Social Sciences (IBM SPSS Statistics) Version 19.0. 
  Descriptive statistics, including means, standard deviations and frequencies, 
quantified all major study variables. We checked the distributions of variables for normality 
and obtained plots of the data (e.g., box-plot, stem-and-leaf plot) to determine the necessity 
of data transformation and/or removal of extreme cases. Also, we examined bivariate 
correlations among the variables.   
Overall Diagnostic Accuracy                                                           
 We modeled overall diagnostic accuracy using two different multiple linear 
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regression (MLR) models. In both models, we predicted that condition status (IV) would lead 
to enhanced decision-making across all four vignettes accounting for participants’ years of 
clinical experience. Tables 10 and 11 provide an overview of participants’ performance on 
the vignettes by condition status and across groups. Note that for Table 10 high scores 
indicate more decision-making errors but for Table 11, high scores indicate greater accuracy.  
 In the first model, we used MLR to test the hypothesis that participants in the 
treatment condition would commit fewer decision-making errors than participants in the 
control condition. See Table 10 for an overview of the total number of errors committed per 
group. Participants ranged from 0 to 4 (i.e., high scores are bad, reflecting more errors). 
Results indicate a significant regression equation (F(2,75) = 10.37, p < .0005) with an R2 of 
.22 using treatment condition and years of experience as predictors of errors. Assignment to 
the training condition predicted significantly lower numbers of errors, p < .0005; however, 
years of clinical experience did not, p > .05. 
 In the second model, MLR tested the hypothesis that participants who received the 
cognitive de-biasing intervention would make more accurate diagnostic decisions. See Table 
11 for an overview of the summary of diagnostic accuracy ratings; participant scores ranged 
from 5 to 12 (i.e., high scores are good). Results indicate a significant regression equation 
(F(2,75) = 10.86, p < .0005) with an R2 of .23, and assignment to the training condition made 
a significant unique contribution even after controlling for years of experience. Years of 
clinical experience did not make a significant unique contribution, p > .05. As proposed in 
the design, we included years of clinical experience in both regression models as a regression 
covariate, but it did not contribute a significant portion of the variance in either model, p > 
.05.  
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Race/Ethnicity Bias: Are Clinicians’ Diagnostic Decisions Vulnerable to Race/Ethnicity 
Bias? 
  
 For each of the four vignettes, we performed chi-square tests to assess for any 
associations between vignette characters’ race/ethnicity (IV) and participants’ diagnostic 
accuracy. Results from chi-square tests indicated no significant associations or trends 
between vignette characters’ race/ethnicity and judgment accuracy. Out of the four vignettes, 
the Lynda vignette (e.g., classic mania symptoms) produced the largest chi-square, χ2 (2) = 
3.94, p = .14. Notably, even the largest chi-square did not approach significance, and the 
pattern of observed versus expected frequencies showed higher rates of accurate decisions 
when Lynda was presented as African-American – in the opposite direction of what would 
have been predicted in a bias hypothesis. Because no associations were found between 
race/ethnicity of vignette characters and diagnostic accuracy, we did not include vignette race 
as a covariate in the regression models presented.  
Performance on Individual Vignettes 
 We ran separate analyses for the base-rate neglect, search satisficing, diagnosis 
momentum, and overconfidence vignettes. Logistic and PLUM regression tested study 
predictions. Logistic regression tested if group status (IV) predicted decision-making errors 
(present/absent). Diagnostic accuracy served as an operational definition for decision-making 
errors, with “accurate” diagnoses indicating no decision-making error and “somewhat” and 
“inaccurate” diagnoses indicating decision-making errors. PLUM regression then tested if 
group status predicted the level of accuracy (e.g., accurate, somewhat accurate, inaccurate). 
Results for the individual vignettes are provided below.  
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Base Rate Neglect: Does the Cognitive De-Biasing Intervention Increase Diagnostic 
Sensitivity to Mania/Hypomania?        
             
 Logistic regression tested if participants in the treatment condition were less likely to 
commit base rate neglect, as demonstrated by their inclusion of bipolar disorder as a probable 
diagnosis. Decision-making error was a dichotomous variable, rated ‘0’ if no error was 
committed and ‘1’ if the participants committed an error (i.e., in this case, base-rate neglect 
by not accounting for the possibility of mania or hypomania in a depressed phase of illness). 
Condition status (treatment or control) (IV) predicted decision-making error (absent or 
present) (DV). In the treatment group, 41% committed a decision-making error, versus 76% 
in the control group, χ2 (1) = 10.10, p < .005.   
 Given the significant results of the logistic regression, the SPSS Ordinal Regression 
procedure, or PLUM regression--an extension of the general linear model to ordinal 
categorical data--tested levels of judgment accuracy (inaccurate, somewhat accurate, 
accurate) and included clinician demographic variables (e.g., years of clinical experience and 
professional title) as regression covariates. We included participants’ professional title as a 
dummy code, with non-psychologists coded as “0” and psychologists coded as “1”.  In the 
treatment group, 56% were psychologists, versus 51% in the control group, χ2 (1) = .21, p = 
.65. 
 PLUM regression tested the hypothesis that participants in the treatment group make 
more accurate diagnostic judgments (DV) than participants in the control condition, as 
evidenced by scores of 3 (e.g., most accurate) than scores of 1 and 2 (e.g., inaccurate and 
somewhat accurate, respectively). Responses that included depression and inquired about 
hypo/mania were coded as accurate versus responses that included depression but missed the 
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possibility of mania/hypomania which were coded as somewhat accurate. Inaccurate 
responses missed depression and/or consideration of mania symptoms. 
 The overall chi-square for the PLUM regression was significant, χ2 (3) = 15.96, p < 
.005, with a Nagelkerke R2 of .23. From the observed significance levels, treatment group 
status was significantly related to diagnostic accuracy in the expected direction, B = -1.64 
(1), p < .005. As predicted, years of clinical experience did not make a significant unique 
contribution, p > .05. Notably, professional title (i.e., psychologist: yes/no) approached 
significance, p = .051, suggesting a trend in psychologists’ diagnostic decisions as being 
more accurate than non-psychologists’ decisions.  
Search Satisficing: Are Clinicians More Sensitive to the Possibility of Comorbid 
Conditions as a Result of the Cognitive De-Biasing Intervention?  
 
 Similar model building tested hypotheses related to search satisficing. Specifically, 
logistic regression tested if participants in the treatment condition were less likely to commit 
search satisficing as evidenced by their consideration of ADHD and mood symptoms. Again, 
decision-making error was a dichotomous variable, rated ‘0’ if no error was committed and 
‘1’ if the participants committed an error. Condition status (treatment or control) (IV) 
predicted decision-making error (absent or present) (DV). In the treatment group, 41% 
committed a decision-making error, versus 68% in the control group. Logistic regression 
revealed a significant relation between condition status and decision-making error, χ2 (1) = 
5.87, p < .05.  
 Given the significant results of the logistic regression, PLUM regression tested levels 
of judgment accuracy (inaccurate, somewhat accurate, accurate) and clinician demographic 
variables (e.g., years of clinical experience and professional title) as regression covariates.  
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Responses that included consideration of ADHD and a bipolar disorder were coded as 
accurate versus responses that included only ADHD or a bipolar disorder which were coded 
as somewhat accurate. Inaccurate responses missed ADHD and bipolar disorder. Consistent 
with previous analyses, we included participants’ professional title as a dummy code (i.e., 
psychologist, yes/no). PLUM regression tested the hypothesis that participants in the 
treatment group make more accurate diagnostic judgments (DV) than participants in the 
control condition, as evidenced by scores of 3 (e.g., most accurate) than scores of 1 and 2 
(e.g., inaccurate and somewhat accurate, respectively).  
 The overall chi-square for the PLUM regression was not significant, χ2 (3) = 6.07, p = 
.11, with a Nagelkerke R2 of .09. From the observed significance levels, group status was 
significantly related to diagnostic accuracy, B = -1.02 (1), p < .05. As predicted, years of 
clinical experience did not make a significant unique contribution, p > .05, nor did 
professional title (i.e., psychologist: yes/no), p > .05. 
Diagnosis Momentum: Are Participants in the Control Condition More Likely to 
Endorse Significantly Higher Probabilities of Bipolar Disorder?  
 
 Multiple linear regression tested the hypothesis that participants’ probabilities of a 
bipolar diagnosis in the treatment group were significantly different than probabilities 
generated by participants in the control condition, accounting for covariates such as years of 
clinical experience, professional title (i.e., psychology: yes/no), subjective numeracy (i.e., 
average score on the subjective numeracy scale), and previous exposure to Bayesian 
approaches. Previous participation in one of Dr. Eric Youngstrom’s continuing education 
(CE) seminars served as a proxy for exposure to Bayesian approaches. Notably, only 6 
participants had attended one of Dr Youngstrom’s CEs (9% of the control group and 6% of 
the treatment group).  
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 Results from MLR indicate that the regression equation was not significant (F(5,71) = 
1.27, p > .05) with an R2 of .08. Condition status made a significant unique contribution, p < 
.05, with the treatment condition’s estimates (M = 37.16, SD = 17.68) being significantly less 
than the control conditions’ (M = 46.47, SD = 18.91). None of the other predictors were 
significant, p > .05. A regression model that only included treatment status without the other 
(inert) covariates would have been significant, suggesting that the omnibus model was 
affected by including so many nonsignificant covariates while working with an only 
moderate sized sample. Table 12 shows the regression coefficients, t values, and p values for 
group status and the regression covariates. 
  For the diagnosis momentum vignette, the true risk estimate was 27% (±5%) based 
on: clinic setting (e.g., the youth is seen in outpatient clinic so the starting base rate of PBD is 
6%); family history information (e.g., the youth has a second degree relative with bipolar 
disorder), and a test score in the moderately high range on the PGBI (which is associated 
with a DLR of 2.22) (Youngstrom, 2005). A one sample t-test supports the prediction that 
participants’ estimates of the probability of a bipolar diagnosis in the control group (M = 
46.47, SD = 18.91) are significantly higher than the “true” Bayesian estimate, which in this 
case was 27%. Notably, control group participants’ estimates are also significantly higher 
when compared to a constant of 32%--the upper limit of +5% from the precise estimate of 
27% (Sedlmeier & Gigerenzer, 2001), suggesting that the control condition was at increased 
risk of diagnosis momentum.  
 A one sample t-test comparing participants’ estimates of the probability of a bipolar 
diagnosis in the treatment group (M = 37.16, SD = 17.68) to the “true” Bayesian estimate 
(again, the constant, 27%) was significantly higher as well, p < .05. However, when we 
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compared the treatment group’s average estimate to 32% (the upper limit), it was no longer 
significant, p > .05.          
 Similar to the coding of the other vignettes, participants’ risk estimates were coded 
for decision-making errors and accuracy. Estimates of 27 and estimates lying within ± 5 
percentage points around the Bayesian estimate (22 to 32) (Sedlmeier & Gigerenzer, 2001) 
were coded as evidencing no decision-making error. Estimates falling outside of ± 5 
percentage points around the Bayesian estimate (<22 and >32) (Sedlmeier & Gigerenzer, 
2001) were coded as evidencing a decision-making error. In the treatment group, 44% 
committed a decision-making error, versus 85% in the control group. Logistic regression 
tested if condition status predicated decision-making error (i.e., in this case, estimates falling 
within +/- 5% of the Bayesian estimate). Results indicate that the cognitive de-biasing 
intervention lead to less cognitive error in synthesizing the case information, X2 (1) = 17.26, 
p < .0005.  
 Notably, we examined outlier diagnostics including the studentized deleted residuals, 
Mahalanobis’ Distance, and Cook’s Distance to verify that the data met regression 
assumptions. Results of the outlier diagnostics revealed two cases where the values predicted 
were substantially discrepant from the actual scores. In examining these two values, we 
found that removing them from our data would increase our R2 and p values but would 
ultimately result in no substantive changes. For this reason, these values were included in our 
analyses.  
Classic Mania: Does the Cognitive De-Biasing Intervention Help Clinicians Better 
Understand Manic Symptoms in Pediatric Populations? 
  
 Similar to the base-rate neglect and search satisficing vignettes, logistic regression 
tested if participants in the treatment condition were less likely to commit decision-making 
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errors when assessing Lynda’s manic symptoms. Again, decision-making error was a 
dichotomous variable, rated ‘0’ if no error was committed and ‘1’ if the participants 
committed an error. Condition status (treatment or control) (IV) predicted decision-making 
error (absent or present) (DV).   
 In the treatment group, 75% committed a decision-making error, versus 83% in the 
control group. Logistic regression revealed no significant relation between condition status 
and decision-making error, χ2 (1) = 0.74, p > .05. 
 We ran PLUM regression to examine if participants’ decision-making between 
groups differed when we applied levels of diagnostic accuracy (accurate, somewhat accurate, 
and inaccurate). Responses that included bipolar I disorder were coded as accurate versus 
responses that included a bipolar spectrum disorder which were coded as somewhat accurate. 
Inaccurate responses missed bipolar altogether. Results indicate the group status was not a 
predictor of diagnostic accuracy for this vignette, B = -.32 (1), p > .05. 
Confidence and Judgment Validity 
 In addition to examining participants’ diagnostic decision-making for classic manic 
symptoms (prior analyses, above), we investigated participants’ confidence and judgment 
validity. Specifically, regression tested whether the discrepancy scores (DV) between 
participants’ accuracy and confidence judgments are significantly different depending on 
treatment group status. Notably, this regression model included discrepancies that reflected 
over and under confident decision-making. Results from the regression show a positive trend, 
in that group status approaches significance in predicting discrepancies, B=-14.28, p = .053, 
with participants in the treatment condition showing smaller discrepancies between the 
accuracy of their judgments and their confidence in those judgments.  
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 We ran a different set of analyses to specifically examine the study prediction that 
participants in the treatment condition would demonstrate less overconfidence (i.e., smaller 
discrepancies between accuracy and confidence in their decision-making) than the control 
group. In this set of analyses, we excluded 22 cases of underconfidence. ANCOVA tested the 
effect of condition status on participant overconfidence (57 cases), covarying out years of 
clinical experience and professional title (psychology: yes/no). Results from the one-way 
between-subjects ANCOVA indicated that years of clinical experience was significantly 
related to overconfidence (F(1,53) = 4.60, p < .05) as was professional title (F(1,53) = 4.82, p 
< .05).  
 Participants with more clinical experience evidenced significantly less 
overconfidence. Non-psychologists (n = 31) were significantly more overconfident (M = 
31.90, SD = 21.08) than psychologists (n = 26; M = 20.77, SD = 20.47). The main effect for 
treatment condition was significant, (F(1,53 = 4.36, p < .05), with the treatment condition’s 
discrepancies between accuracy and overconfidence (M = 18.62, SD = 17.45) significantly 
less than the control conditions’ (M = 32.17, SD = 22.40). On average, participants in the 
treatment condition displayed significantly less overconfidence than participants in the 
control condition.  
Decision-Making Errors and Practice Implications                                                         
 Chi-squared analyses tested study predictions regarding practice implications of 
faulty heuristics and biases. Specifically, we hypothesized that somewhat accurate and 
inaccurate diagnoses would be associated with significantly different assessment and 
treatment choices. To examine the clinical implications of cognitive errors, for each 
heuristic/bias investigated in the case vignettes, chi-squared tests evaluated the relationship 
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between the particular heuristic/bias and participant recommended clinical action (e.g., 
heuristic [present/absent] x clinical action [more assessment/therapy/medication /no offer of 
treatment/other]). We used the accuracy of participants’ diagnoses (including participants in 
both conditions) as the operational definition for the presence of decision errors. Consistent 
with other coding, inaccurate or somewhat inaccurate diagnostic judgments were coded as 
“positive” for the occurrence of a decision-making error (i.e., decision-making error present); 
accurate diagnostic decisions were “negative” for decision-making errors. Chi-squared tests 
for each vignette are provided below.  
 Chi-square tests for the search satisficing (χ2 (4) = 6.21, p > .05) and base rate neglect 
(χ2 (6) = 7.27, p > .05) showed no significant associations between decision-making error and 
next clinical action, considered globally. However, for the base-rate neglect vignette, we 
tested the association between decision-making error and selection of antidepressant 
medication (or referral for antidepressant medication) as the next clinical action and we 
found a significant association, χ2 (1) = 4.91, p < .05. The pattern of observed versus 
expected frequencies showed that when people failed to consider hypomania/mania history, 
they were significantly more likely to recommend consideration of an antidepressant.  
 For the diagnosis momentum vignette, which included participants providing 
likelihood estimates of the probability of bipolar disorder, chi-squared revealed a trend but no 
significant association between decision-making error and next clinical action 
recommendation, χ2 (4) = 8.57, p = .07.  
 Finally, for the vignette depicting a youth with classic mania symptoms, chi-square 
revealed a positive association between decision-making error and next clinical action, χ2 (3) 
= 18.60, p < .0005. The pattern of observed versus expected frequencies showed that when 
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participants detected bipolar disorder they were more likely to recommend medication and 
assessment.  
Clinician Experience of the Vignette Exercise 
 The majority of participants reported that the case vignettes used in the study 
resembled clients that they have seen in their respective practice settings. Specifically, 
nineteen percent strongly agreed, 37% agreed, and 40% somewhat agreed to this statement. 
Three percent somewhat disagreed and one percent disagreed. 
 ANCOVA tested the prediction that the cognitive de-biasing intervention would have 
a positive effect on participant experience of the case vignette portion of the study. In 
particular, we anticipated that participants in the treatment group would demonstrate 
significantly more favorable attitudes toward the case vignette exercise than participants in 
the control group. Using ANCOVA, we tested whether group status had an effect on 
participant attitudes after adjusting for covariates such as years of clinical experience and 
participants’ professional title (e.g., psychology: yes/no).  
 Two main dimensions of participants’ attitudes toward the vignette exercise were 
evaluated, including: (a) how challenging participants found the vignette exercise; and, (b) 
participants’ overall confidence in their diagnostic and treatment decisions. On average, 
participants in both groups agreed that it was challenging to make diagnostic decisions for 
vignette characters. Psychologists (M = 3.67, SD = 1.41) were slightly yet significantly more 
confident than non-psychologists (M = 3.06, SD = .89). 
 Results from the one-way between-subjects ANCOVA indicated that years of clinical 
experience was not significantly related to how challenging participants found the vignette 
exercise F(1,73) = .01, p = .94); however, participant title was significant, F(1,73) = 4.66, p = 
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.03, with psychologists (M = 2.02 SD = .84) finding the vignette exercise significantly less 
challenging than non-psychologists (M = 2.44 SD = .93). Treatment status was not 
significant, (F(1,73) = .04, p = .84 with the treatment condition’s rating (M = 2.22, SD = .83) 
comparable to the control conditions’ (M = 2.22, SD = .96).  
 We found a similar pattern of findings with respect to participants’ overall confidence 
in their diagnostic and treatment decisions for the case vignettes. Specifically, ANCOVA 
indicated that years of clinical experience was not significantly related to participants’ self-
reported confidence in their diagnostic decisions F(1,73) = 1.04, p > .05); however, 
participant title was significant, F(1,73) = 8.45, p < .05, with psychologists reporting higher 
confidence (M = 3.67, SD = .89) than non-psychologists (M = 3.06, SD = 1.14). Intervention 
status was not significant, (F(1,76) = .34, p > .05) with the treatment condition’s rating (M = 
3.50, SD = 1.05) comparable to the control conditions’ (M = 3.30, SD = 1.09).  
 Finally, in terms of participants’ self-reported confidence in their treatment decisions, 
ANCOVA indicated no significant results. Specifically, years of clinical experience was not 
significant (F(1,73) = 2.82, p > .05) nor was psychologist versus other professional status-- 
F(1,73) = 1.44, p > .05. Also, the main effect for condition status was not significant, F(1,73) 
= 1.76, p > .05. On average, participants in both groups experienced similar levels of 
confidence in their treatment decisions. 
Clinician Attitudes toward the Intervention       
 Descriptive statistics supported the hypothesis that clinicians who received the 
intervention would find it helpful and informative. Out of thirty-two participants in the 
treatment condition, 22% strongly agreed to learning something new, 56% agreed, and 22% 
somewhat agreed. Sixteen percent strongly agreed to finding the tutorial helpful to for 
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making diagnostic decisions in the case vignettes, with 50% agreeing and 34% somewhat 
agreeing. 
 When asked if they would recommend the intervention to a colleague, 25% strongly 
agreed, 47% agreed, and 28% somewhat agreed. Finally, twenty-two percent strongly agreed 
that information in the tutorial was easy to understand, with 59% agreeing and 16% 
somewhat agreeing. Notably, the majority of participants in the treatment condition (91%) 
reported using material from the cognitive de-biasing intervention when responding to the 
case vignettes.  
 Additionally, we ran post hoc analyses to examine the potential influence of 
participants’ preference for numerical versus prose information on their attitude toward the 
cognitive de-biasing intervention. Specifically, given the Bayesian component of the de-
biasing intervention, we predicted that higher ratings on the Subjective Numeracy Scale (IV) 
would lead to more positive ratings of the cognitive de-biasing intervention (DV). Results 
from the simple linear regression indicate no significant relationship between participants’ 
scores on the SNS and participants’ attitudes toward the vignette--F(1,30) = 0.00, p > .05, 
with an R2 of 0.00. This suggests that the de-biasing methods may not be limited to those of a 
more quantitative persuasion.  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
 The overarching goal of the present study was to test the efficacy of a new cognitive 
de-biasing intervention aimed at improving clinicians’ assessment of PBD and common 
comorbid conditions. In short, we sought to better understand where mistakes occur and how 
to improve practice with science. Recent research documents the clinical utility of evidence-
based tools for decreasing the overdiagnosis of PBD and helping clinicians detect true cases 
of PBD (Jenkins, et al., 2011; Youngstrom, et al., 2009); however, we are unaware of any 
existing research that has (a) tested these strategies using experimental methods; (b) with 
multiple case vignettes; (c) through a decision-making lens; and, (d) as part of a broader yet 
targeted intervention package (i.e., participants learned about cognitive vulnerabilities 
specific to PBD and de-biasing tools for assessment; see Table 5 for a comprehensive 
overview of  intervention components). Main hypotheses and findings are discussed in more 
detail below.  
 Clinicians have demonstrated substantial difficulty accurately and efficiently 
diagnosing PBD (Kessler, 1999; Marchand, Wirth, & Simon, 2006; Youngstrom, Birmaher, 
& Findling, 2008; Youngstrom, Findling, Youngstrom, & Calabrese, 2005) as evidenced by 
frequent delays in diagnosis, misdiagnosis, and overdiagnosis (Hirschfeld, Lewis, & Vornik, 
2003; Kessler, et al., 1997; Lish et al., 1994). Unfortunately, misdiagnosis of PBD and 
associated treatment delays carry serious consequences (e.g., see Dunner, 2003; Geller, 
Tillman, Craney, & Bolhofner, 2004; cf. Joseph, Youngstrom, & Soares, 2009). From a 
decision-making perspective, the complex presentation of bipolar illness, coupled with its 
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relatively low prevalence and high stakes status, increases the likelihood of cognitive errors 
(Croskerry, 2003; Davidow & Levinson, 1993). Also, there is a tendency for mental health 
professionals to rely solely on clinical judgment in making important diagnostic decisions. 
This approach is problematic given the decades of research showing that clinical judgment 
can compromise optimal decision-making (Aegisdottir, et al., 2006; Croskerry, 2002; Elstein 
& Schwartz, 2002; Klein, 2005; Meehl, 1954).   
 At present, there is relatively little information about decision-making and the clinical 
utility of cognitive de-biasing strategies in mental health. Fortunately, related disciplines 
including cognitive science and medical decision-making have more well-established 
decision-making literatures about cognitive error and de-biasing interventions (Croskerry, 
2003). These literatures can help inform new approaches for improving diagnostic and 
treatment decisions for challenging psychiatric disorders such as pediatric bipolar disorder.  
Overall Diagnostic Accuracy 
 As predicted, participants’ judgments in the treatment group evidenced higher overall 
decision accuracy than participants’ judgments in the control condition. We measured overall 
decision accuracy in two ways: total decision-making errors and diagnostic accuracy ratings 
across all four vignettes. In both cases, the treatment group performed significantly better 
than the control group. In particular, participants who received the cognitive de-biasing 
intervention committed fewer decision-making errors and generated more accurate diagnoses 
for multiple vignettes with various case presentations.  
 Our investigation of overall diagnostic accuracy examined the influence of 
participants’ amount of clinical experience. Notably, participants had a wide range of clinical 
experience (e.g., early stage career professionals to professionals with 20+ years), and 
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participants had comparable amounts of clinical experience between the treatment and 
control groups. As predicted, amount of clinical experience consistently had no effect on 
participants’ diagnostic accuracy, including their overall accuracy and their accuracy on 
individual vignettes. This non-significant result is noteworthy in light of the literature 
suggesting that additional clinical experience does not necessarily enhance clinical judgment, 
and instead can reinforce faulty cognitive habits (Brehmer, 1980, 1998; Faust, 1986; Faust, 
1994; Faust, et al., 1988; Faust & Ziskin, 1988; Garb, 1989; Spengler, et al., 2009; Wedding, 
1991; Wiggins, 1973; Ziskin, 1995). One may be surprised by the finding that clinicians with 
decades of more experience performed similar to early stage professionals. It is important to 
point out that diagnosing bipolar disorder in youth populations is a relatively new practice, 
and that more seasoned professionals were likely not trained in the assessment or treatment 
of PBD in their respective training programs. Given the significant treatment effect, it 
appears that clinicians can benefit from cognitive de-biasing strategies regardless of how 
long they have been practicing in the field.  
Race/Ethnicity Bias 
 Contrary to study hypotheses, participants’ diagnoses were not affected by the 
race/ethnicity of the vignette character. Specifically, clinicians’ rates of bipolar diagnoses did 
not vary as a function of the youth being African American or Caucasian, with all other case 
information held equal by design. It is worth noting that in addition to describing the youth’s 
race/ethnicity in the case vignettes, we included a picture of the fictitious youth to make 
race/ethnicity more salient to study participants (see Appendix E). Our non-significant 
race/ethnicity findings are intriguing given the tendency for clinicians in the community to 
misdiagnose African-American youths with conduct disorder or schizophrenia (DelBello, et 
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al., 2001; Fabrega, Ulrich, & Mezzich, 1993; Kilgus, Pumariega, & Cuffe, 1995) when there 
is no empirical support for variation in diagnostic rates of bipolar across racial and ethnic 
groups (American Psychiatric Association, 2001; Grant, et al., 2005; Jonas, et al., 2003; 
Kessler, et al., 2005; Van Meter, et al., 2011).  
 Although contrary to our study predictions, this finding is consistent with findings 
from recent ethnographic studies (Carpenter-Song, 2009). Specifically, qualitative 
methodologies have revealed potential differences in how minority populations describe 
mood symptoms, possibly emphasizing behavioral issues versus emotional problems 
(Carpenter-Song, 2009). In turn, clinicians may mistakenly focus on externalizing symptoms 
and fail to detect mood symptoms. This possibility raises the question of whether another 
heuristic may be at play that better accounts for clinicians’ cognitive error than race/ethnicity 
bias. The present study’s vignette methodology may not have been as sensitive to this type of 
race/ethnicity bias (or other heuristic at play), particularly inasmuch as participants could not 
ask follow-up questions that might have amplified the effects of faulty heuristics; thus, future 
research may want to consider alternative methods for testing race/ethnicity bias as well as 
how to best operationalize this cognitive error. 
 In general, race/ethnicity bias in clinical decision-making continues to be a significant 
concern, especially for African Americans for whom recent evidence indicates a rise in 
mental health disparities (Cook et al., 2007). Researchers advocate for additional mixed-
methods research to elucidate the role, forms and effects of bias (Carpenter-Song, Whitley, 
Lawson, Quimby, & Drake, 2011). Although experimental methods have certain benefits, it 
is possible that we currently do not have a good enough understanding of race/ethnicity bias 
in the role of assessing childhood mood disorders to test for this bias using experimental 
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designs. Alternatively, we were not powered to detect small effect sizes for analyses 
examining race/ethnicity bias, in which case experimental methods may be well suited for 
testing race/ethnicity but require increased power. Taken together, it will likely be 
advantageous to consider alternative methods (e.g., qualitative interviews) as follow up 
studies to the present project as well as increasing power in experimental studies to detect 
smaller effect sizes.  
Performance on Individual Vignettes 
 Although each vignette tested a different decision-making error, we took a similar 
approach to examining the treatment effect across all of the vignettes. Notably, the diagnosis 
momentum vignette involved some additional analyses: It was the only vignette that required 
participants to estimate the risk of a bipolar diagnosis using percentages. For each vignette, 
we also investigated similar covariates, including years of clinical experience and 
professional title (e.g., psychology or non-psychology professional). Consistently across all 
four vignettes, both years of clinical experience and professional title made no significant 
impact in participants’ decision-making performance. Findings from each vignette as well as 
the broader implications are discussed below. 
 Base Rate Neglect. Unlike participants in the control condition, who received a brief 
introduction to PBD, participants in the treatment group were more likely to assess for 
hypomania or mania and/or consider bipolar disorder as a probable diagnosis in the presence 
of depressive symptoms. The intervention appears to help safeguard clinicians’ decision-
making, particularly from cognitive errors associated with the cyclical nature of bipolar 
illness (e.g., florid mania, severe depression, mixed or a euthymic state)--a major challenge 
associated with assessing bipolar disorder (Youngstrom, 2005). This finding is especially 
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meaningful because going into this vignette, all clinician participants were primed for bipolar 
as a function of the brief overview of PBD provided before the case vignette exercise. 
However, only the treatment group demonstrated diagnostic sensitivity to hypo/mania when a 
case presented with depression and no current symptoms of elevated mood. This finding 
suggests that the observed significant effect was likely the result of the intervention and not 
priming or recency effects from the PBD overview. Minimizing base-rate neglect (as the 
cognitive de-biasing intervention accomplished) has important practice implications 
including decreasing long delays in diagnosis (Hirschfeld, et al., 2003; Marchand, et al., 
2006) as well as rates of underdiagnosis (Angst, 2007). Moreover, roughly one third of mood 
disorder diagnoses may be on the bipolar spectrum, but the majority of individuals seek 
treatment when feeling depressed. Thus, failure to probe for hypomania or past mania 
contributes heavily to misclassification.  
 Search Satisficing. Per recommendations by Croskerry (2003), the intervention 
provided clinicians specific training on potential overlap between ADHD and bipolar 
symptoms as well as mechanisms for considering alternatives (e.g., checklists). These 
specific cognitive de-biasing strategies seem effective for helping clinicians tease apart 
symptoms and correctly identify comorbid conditions. Consistent with study predictions, 
clinicians who received the cognitive de-biasing intervention were significantly less likely to 
commit search satisficing by accounting for symptoms of both ADHD and PBD in their 
diagnostic decisions (and not “calling off the search” when they diagnosed one of the 
disorders). Given that bipolar disorder and ADHD co-occur more frequently than by chance 
(Singh, DelBello, Kowatch, & Strakowski, 2006) and that comorbid bipolar disorder and 
ADHD has been associated with poorer global functioning, greater symptoms severity, and 
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more additional comorbidity than for either single disorder (Arnold, et al., 2011), our 
observed improvement in clinicians’ decision-making has substantial value for real-world 
practice.  
 Recently in the medical decision-making literature, cognitive forcing strategies such 
as checklists have gained particular attention, especially for diagnostic purposes (Ely, Graber, 
& Croskerry, 2011). Checklists function to decrease clinicians’ reliance on intuition and 
memory in clinical problem-solving, and they are especially attractive tool for complex 
diagnoses (Ely, Graber, & Croskerry, 2011). Overall, given the high comorbidity rates of 
psychiatric disorders in pediatric populations (Angold, Costello, & Erkanli, 1999), including 
bipolar disorder as well as other disorders (Kowatch, Youngstrom, Danielyan, & Findling, 
2005), and the preliminary support for the effectiveness of checklists found in the present 
study, more research focused on cognitive forcing strategies and user-friendly checklists 
seems warranted.  
 Diagnosis Momentum. In addition to some evidence of staggering rates of 
overdiagnosis (Blader & Carlson, 2007; Moreno, et al., 2007), research has shown a tendency 
for clinicians to overestimate the likelihood of PBD compared to the supporting evidence 
when presented with case information (Jenkins, et al., 2011). Clinicians in the control 
condition of the present study demonstrated a similar susceptibility to diagnosis momentum. 
Clinicians’ risk estimates in the control group were significantly higher than both the true 
risk estimate (based on Bayesian reasoning) and the treatment group’s risk estimates. Similar 
to the other vignettes, clinicians’ years of experience and professional title (i.e., psychology 
or non-psychology professional) did not play a significant role in diagnostic accuracy. For 
this vignette, we also examined clinicians’ previous exposure to Bayesian approaches and 
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their self-ratings on the Subjective Numeracy Scale. Our finding that neither one of these 
factors significantly predicted risk estimate accuracy, supports generalizability of the 
intervention. Specifically, our findings provide preliminary support that clinicians do not 
need prior knowledge of Bayesian reasoning or to endorse a preference for or ability in 
numeracy (including working with probabilities) to use actuarial assessment methods 
effectively.  
 Further, we examined whether the cognitive de-biasing intervention predicted fewer 
decision-making errors. Findings indicate that the intervention resulted in less cognitive error 
in synthesizing the case information. Consistent with previous research, teaching clinicians 
actuarial methods helped decrease overdiagnosis of PBD and generated more accurate 
decision-making (Jenkins, et al., 2011). Of significance, this was our first attempt to teach 
actuarial methods using the Web. The significant treatment effect observed in the present 
study supports future research examining the effectiveness of online training of Bayesian 
approaches. 
 Detecting Mania. Contrary to study hypotheses, training condition status did not 
influence diagnostic accuracy of clinicians’ assessment of more classic mania symptoms. Our 
definition of accurate diagnoses was relatively stringent. Only responses that included 
bipolar I disorder were coded as accurate; responses that included a bipolar spectrum 
disorder were coded as somewhat accurate. Inaccurate responses missed bipolar altogether. 
A more lenient approach could have assigned bipolar spectrum diagnoses full credit versus 
the partial credit participants received by our guidelines. Although we considered this 
alternative classification, several factors emerged during our review of the case vignette that 
prompted us to go forward with the more stringent guidelines. The details in the vignette are 
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completely sufficient to satisfy all DSM-IV criteria for a manic episode: duration criteria 
(e.g., 1 week or longer); severity (e.g., impairment occurred); intermittent presentation of 
symptoms (i.e., consistent with episodic nature of mood disorders); and, number of 
symptoms (e.g., grandiosity, hypersexuality as an example of disinhibited and risky behavior, 
psychomotor agitation, and distractibility – meeting criteria for at least four “B Criterion” 
symptoms in addition to the episodic disturbance of mood) (4th ed. [DSM-IV]; American 
Psychiatric Association, 1994). Also, we conducted a post hoc analysis to examine the 
potential treatment effect if we assigned full credit for bipolar spectrum diagnoses. Again, we 
observed no treatment effect.  
 Overall, findings on this vignette likely reflect the extreme difficulty a clinician 
encounters when diagnosing manic symptoms in youth in the real-world (Carlson, 1988). 
Clinicians’ low diagnostic sensitivity to mania in the study vignette suggests: (1) an area of 
the cognitive de-biasing intervention to strengthen; and, (2) a potential weakness of the 
vignette methodology.  
 First, the intervention may benefit from incorporating role plays with individuals 
evidencing manic-like symptoms, or to find ethical and respectful mechanisms for showing 
real-life depictions of symptoms from individuals with bipolar illness. Given the complicated 
nature of this diagnosis, more intensive training such as role-plays may be necessary to bring 
about significant improvement in interviewing and cognitive interpretation and diagnostic 
decision-making. Second, as an artifact of the case vignette methodology, participants could 
not ask follow-up questions that might have helped confirm suspicions of bipolar I disorder 
and helped clinicians be more confident in making this high stakes diagnosis. However, this 
possibility should be considered within the context of a large body of literature that 
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unstructured clinical interviewing rarely addresses a consistent body of content, and 
agreement between clinical diagnoses and semi-structured interviews is modest at best 3. 
Thus, allowing more follow-up questions without also providing cognitive decision-supports 
or de-biasing strategies could as easily make judgments worse.   
Confidence and Judgment Validity  
 Based on the vignette depicting a youth with more classic manic symptoms, clinicians 
responded to a series of multiple choice questions presented in a randomized order following 
their diagnosis and treatment decisions for the vignette character. For each answer clinicians 
provided to the five multiple choice questions, they also provided a confidence estimate 
indicating their confidence in their response to that particular question. This process 
established a direct comparison between the level of accuracy and the level of confidence 
(see study procedures for a review; Oskamp, 1965). 
 We anticipated that clinicians in the treatment group, who learned de-biasing 
strategies, would have a more accurate sense of confidence, operationally defined here as 
smaller discrepancies between the accuracy of their judgments and their confidence in those 
judgments. Results confirmed the hypothesis, both when we examined combined 
discrepancies (i.e., instances of under and over confidence) as well as when we focused 
solely on overconfidence (i.e., discrepancies between accuracy and confidence in which the 
accuracy of their judgments was less than their confidence ratings). Specifically, we found a 
positive trend (p = .053) when looking at under and over confidence, and we found 
significant differences between groups for overconfidence despite the reduced sample size 
used for the more focal hypothesis.   
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 Overconfidence Bias. As hypothesized, clinicians who received the intervention 
showed significantly less overconfidence bias than clinicians in the control condition. In this 
set of analyses, we also examined the influence of years of experience and professional title 
(psychologist: yes/no), and we found that both were significantly related to overconfidence. 
Notably, psychologists and clinicians with more experience demonstrated significantly less 
overconfidence bias. Given the exploratory nature of this secondary aim, we are curious if 
additional research testing similar effects will generate comparable findings.  
 The significant treatment effect for overconfidence bias is especially intriguing given 
the insignificant treatment effect we found for diagnostic accuracy and decision-making error 
for the same vignette character. Although the dependent variables are different (i.e., 
overconfidence is a different construct than diagnostic accuracy and decision-making error), 
the content that clinicians are using to make their decisions is similar. Specifically, the 
multiple choice questions required participants to identify classic manic symptoms (e.g., 
grandiosity, hypersexualism, psychomotor agitation), the vignette character’s probable 
disorder (e.g., bipolar I disorder), and the likely cause of her change in functioning (e.g., 
mood disturbance). See Appendix F for a copy of the multiple choice questions and response 
options. In light of the significant treatment effect when clinicians worked with more 
concrete diagnostic decisions (versus the more open ended vignette and list of 26 possible 
disorders from which to choose), it appears that the intervention was helpful for accurately 
assessing mania. In particular, clinicians in the treatment group were significantly more 
accurate on multiple choice questions, and they demonstrated a better understanding of their 
understanding or misunderstanding of the characters’ behaviors and problems (i.e., the 
smaller discrepancies and less overconfidence). Clearly, we need more research to better 
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understand the role of clinician confidence as well as how to best assess discrepancies 
between accuracy and confidence including the impact of clinicians’ amount of experience 
and their professional title.   
Decision-Making Errors and Practice Implications 
 A secondary goal of the present study involved testing the potential influence of 
decision accuracy on clinician’s recommended treatment approaches. Accurate diagnosis of 
PBD is especially important before starting treatment (Weller, Danielyan, & Weller, 2004; 
Kowatch, et al., 2005). We examined the clinical implications of the primary cognitive errors 
of interest including base rate neglect, search satisficing, diagnosis momentum, and 
overconfidence bias. Specifically, we predicted that committing one of these faulty heuristics 
would affect clinicians’ treatment formulations. Consistent with our previous coding scheme, 
inaccurate and somewhat accurate decisions were coded as positive for committing an error 
while accurate decisions were coded as error free. For each of the primary diagnoses 
clinicians assigned to the vignette characters, they were asked to recommend a next clinical 
action (i.e., representing their treatment formulation). Their choices for next clinical action 
consisted of: more assessment, therapy, medication, no treatment necessary, and other. 
Participants could select up to two of these options for any given diagnosis.  
 Several findings warrant attention. First, for the vignette character depicting more 
classic mania symptoms--diagnostically, a particularly challenging vignette for clinicians 
regardless of condition status--we found a significant association between diagnostic error 
and next clinical action. Specifically, when participants detected bipolar disorder, they were 
more likely to recommend medication and assessment. In this case, an accurate diagnosis 
aligned with recommended treatment guidelines in the literature (Kowatch, et al., 2005). 
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 Second, although base-rate neglect was not significantly related with global choices 
about next clinical action in terms of assessment, psychotherapy, or medication, our analyses 
revealed a significant association between this decision-making error and type of medication 
recommendation. In particular, when clinicians overlooked the possibility of 
hypomania/mania history, they were significantly more likely to recommend antidepressant 
medication. Given that antidepressants are largely ineffective for treatment of bipolar 
depression (Nierenberg, et al., 2006) and can possibly worsen outcome (cf. Joseph, 
Youngstrom, & Soares, 2009), it is worth noting this significant finding. Improved detection 
of hypomania or mania in people seeking treatment for depression is consistent with FDA 
recommendations for antidepressant medication use and would decrease the lag between 
onset of mood problems and recognition of bipolar disorder (Hirschfeld, et al., 2003; Lish, et 
al., 1994). 
 Third, for the diagnosis momentum vignette, we found a positive trend such that when 
clinicians did not overestimate the likelihood of bipolar disorder without adequate evidence 
(as evidenced by a risk estimate in the “acceptable” range compared to the Bayesian 
estimate), they were more likely to recommend additional assessment. This treatment 
formulation for this level of risk coincides with current recommendations in the literature 
(see Youngstrom, et al., 2009).  
 Finally, it is important to point out that we were underpowered to detect small effect 
sizes for our investigation of practice implications of cognitive errors. It is possible that with 
an increased sample size, the positive trend we found for diagnosis momentum would 
become significant. Likewise, it is possible that with more power, we would have detected 
additional smaller yet significant associations for the other heuristics of interest (e.g., base-
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rate neglect). Additional research with higher powered analyses will be advantageous for 
further examining the relationship between cognitive errors and treatment formulation.    
Clinician Attitudes  
 The Vignette Exercise. Contrary to study predictions, control and treatment group 
participants provided comparable ratings of their experiences participating in the vignette 
exercise. Specifically, we examined how challenging clinicians found the vignettes as well as 
their confidence in their diagnostic and treatment decisions across all of the vignettes. Given 
that clinicians in the treatment group displayed higher diagnostic accuracy than clinicians in 
the control group on three out of four of the individual vignettes as well as on overall 
diagnostic accuracy, it is surprising that we did not observe a treatment effect on these 
dimensions.  
 Notably, psychologists found the case vignettes significantly less challenging than the 
other professionals did, and they also endorsed significantly higher confidence in their 
diagnostic decisions. Because the emphasis on assessment tends to differentiate 
psychologists from other mental health professionals, it is possible that psychologists had 
greater familiarity with this type of exercise and/or assessment in general. It will be 
interesting and important to further examine differences among mental health professionals’ 
attitudes in future studies.  
 Related, it is likely that in order to better understand clinician attitudes we need to 
develop a more comprehensive questionnaire. Due to feasibility constraints (i.e., limited 
funds to compensate clinicians for their time), we kept our vignette attitudes questionnaire 
brief. In future studies, it will be important to consider how we can expand our questionnaire 
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to more fully understand clinicians’ experience of case vignettes, or to incorporate interviews 
and other qualitative methods.  
 Most participants agreed that vignette characters resembled clients in their respective 
clinical settings. This is noteworthy because it: (1) reinforces our belief that vignette 
characters represented real-world cases, simulating actual practice as much as case vignette 
methodology can; and, (2) it suggests that cognitive de-biasing strategies will generalize to 
community settings (i.e., the assessment tools are not just effective in a “lab” setting).   
 The Cognitive De-Biasing Intervention. Overall, clinicians were very positive about 
the cognitive de-biasing intervention. When presented with six possible response options 
ranging from strongly disagree to strongly agree, participants in the treatment group 
unanimously provided favorable responses (e.g., somewhat agree, agree, or strongly agree). 
In particular, clinicians endorsed learning something new, recommending the intervention to 
a colleague, finding information in the intervention easy to understand, and finding the 
intervention helpful for making diagnostic decisions in the case vignettes. Perhaps most 
importantly from an interventionist perspective, the majority of participants in the treatment 
condition (91%) reported using material from the cognitive de-biasing intervention when 
responding to the case vignettes.  
 Historically, the uptake of empirically driven approaches into practice has been slow 
(Glasziou & Haynes, 2005; Rogers, 2003; Straus, et al., 2011). For example, the literature 
abounds with evidence-based treatments; however, the adoption of these approaches into 
applied settings often gets lost in translation (Dawes, Faust, & Meehl, 1989; Mass, 2003; 
Meehl, 1986). Further, several mental health initiatives recognize that effective approaches 
exist that are not being widely implemented in care (Ganju, 2006; Institute of Medicine, 
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2001, 2006; U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 2001). Given the exploratory 
nature of the present study, the positive feedback from clinicians in the community and their 
use of intervention materials in responding to case vignettes is very encouraging. 
Nevertheless, it will be important to continue eliciting clinician’s attitudes and expand the 
role of clinician feedback as we tailor the intervention and look for ways to improve its 
clinical utility.  
  It is also promising that clinicians’ preferences for the use of numerical versus prose 
information, as measured by the Subjective Numeracy Scale (Fagerlin, et al., 2007), did not 
influence their attitudes toward the intervention. We predicted that preferences for the 
presentation of numerical and probabilistic information would lead to more positive attitudes 
toward the intervention. This prediction was not substantiated. Despite a notable range in 
clinician preferences, we found a near zero relationship between preferences for numerical 
preference and attitude toward the intervention. Given the Bayesian component of the 
cognitive de-biasing intervention, this finding is compelling because it suggests that the 
intervention is user-friendly and may generalize to a wide audience of mental health 
professionals. 
Limitations 
 The advantages of this project must be weighed against the possible limitations. First, 
the external validity of studies with case vignettes can be limited because vignettes may not 
fully reflect complex interpersonal situations and contextual pressures present in real life 
diagnosis. Vignettes can also fall short in eliciting intense emotion -- which may itself 
increase judgment distortion. Participants also may process vignette content less carefully 
than under actual conditions (Abramowitz & Herrera, 1981; Heverly, Fitt, & Newman, 1984; 
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Kazdin, 1978; Lopez, 1989; Mikton & Grounds, 2007; Stolte, 1994). Nevertheless, case 
vignettes are still the most favorable method for investigating the present study aims given 
the exploratory nature of this research (i.e., a new intervention designed to improve clinical 
judgment in the assessment of PBD). Results suggest that extension to a trial using cognitive 
de-biasing training in the context of new, live therapy referrals would be a promising next 
step. 
 A second limitation is the restricted number of cognitive errors that the project could 
feasibly investigate (i.e., over thirty heuristics have been identified in the literature) 
(Croskerry, 2002). To account for this limitation, heuristics for the present study were 
carefully selected. For example, a thorough literature review informed the selection process. 
Heuristics were chosen that seemed most probable given the specific challenges associated 
with the clinical assessment of PBD (e.g., symptom overlap, base rate neglect). By focusing 
on heuristics likely to operate in more cases, it is possible to generate good coverage with a 
smaller number of targets – a principle often referred to as Pareto’s 80:20 Rule, or the “Law 
of the Vital Few.”  
  Another limitation of the study was the imbalance of study participants in the 
treatment and control conditions. Future investigations could benefit from an urn 
randomization design that would accommodate randomization as well as offer an even 
balance of participants across study conditions (Project MATCH Research Group, 1997). 
Additionally, we did not conduct any pre/post tests that may have better informed the quality 
of clinicians’ decision-making before and after the intervention, possibly increasing internal 
validity. This design feature was initially contemplated; however, several practical 
considerations including feasibility concerns (e.g., participants’ time and limited funding for 
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compensation) made this option unattractive. Notably, the randomization process and the 
experimental manipulation of key variables (e.g., race/ethnicity) serve a similar purpose. 
Participants’ similar demographic and professional backgrounds across the two conditions 
support the effectiveness of the randomization.  
  Related, a larger number of participants in both conditions would increase power and 
permit additional analyses. For example, a larger sample with more clinicians from different 
professional backgrounds (e.g., psychiatry, clinical psychology) would allow us to examine 
professional title as a meaningful covariate in the regression models. Further, a larger sample 
size could clarify some of the trends we found (e.g., the relationships between cognitive 
errors and treatment formulations could change from trends to significant associations). 
Likewise, as previously noted, some of the analyses for our secondary aims were 
underpowered to detect small effect sizes. Again, a larger sample size may reveal more 
significant results. Taken together, increasing power could provide yet greater empirical 
support for the cognitive de-biasing intervention. On balance, the intervention appears to 
generate a variety of medium to large effects on clinical decision-making. 
  Further, it is important to highlight the possibility of potential design biases. The first 
is self-selection bias: Clinicians who participated in the study may reflect a subset of 
clinicians who are particularly eager to learn new assessment methods and/or interested in 
childhood mood disorders. One indicator of this possibility is the high number of participants 
(96%) reporting prior training in evidence-based practice. It is unclear whether this reflects 
selection bias, versus a frequently observed tendency for practitioners’ self-ratings to indicate 
higher levels of evidence-based practice than would be discernible based on independent 
ratings (Shapiro, Youngstrom, Youngstrom, & Marcinick, 2012). Self-selection bias may 
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decrease generalizability of study findings, but it may also have resulted in diminished effect 
sizes (i.e., participants in the control condition may be more assessment savvy than the 
average clinician). We advocate for additional research to disentangle these potentially 
competing tendencies.  
  The second possible bias may have occurred via priming from the information 
communicated to participants prior to their responding to the case vignettes. Participants 
were primed for childhood mood disorders regardless of group assignment. This inevitable 
event may have increased participants’ sensitivity to bipolar disorder in their diagnostic 
decisions. This sensitivity may have enhanced control condition participants’ performance in 
vignettes such as the search satisficing and base-rate neglect vignettes. Again, the effect of 
this priming would be to increase the sensitivity of control participants to bipolar features, 
akin to enhancing the rate of placebo response in a treatment study, thus attenuating 
treatment effects. The fact that the de-biasing strategies continued to show statistically 
significant and moderate to large treatment effects attests to the potency and promise of the 
approach.   
  Despite these limitations, this project stands to significantly contribute to the mental 
health field, scientifically and clinically. In addition to training more than thirty clinicians in 
cognitive de-biasing strategies and making the intervention available to all study participants, 
participants responded favorably to this new approach to improving assessment of childhood 
mood disorders. This positive feedback from providers on the front line is encouraging, 
especially given the innovative nature of the intervention (i.e., adapting strategies from 
cognitive science and medical literatures to mental health issues) and the historically slow 
uptake of evidence-based practices in the community. 
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Future Directions 
 Despite many encouraging findings, substantial research is needed to elucidate the 
role of cognitive de-biasing in improving mental health decision-making. Several avenues for 
future research have already been highlighted; however, to summarize, it appears as though 
the most critical next steps involve tailoring some of the strategies (e.g., more intensive 
cognitive de-biasing strategies involving role-plays and simulation for bipolar I disorder), 
and expanding our sample of clinicians. To our knowledge, this project was the first attempt 
to develop a cognitive de-biasing intervention to address diagnostic error. In light of the 
significant findings, it seems advantageous to use this exploratory investigation as an 
opportunity to refine the intervention and study design (e.g., flesh out attitudes 
questionnaire), and to continue testing its efficacy.  
 Along similar lines, more research is needed to examine the effectiveness of online 
teaching resources for mental health practitioners as well as the best mediums for presenting 
information to audiences (e.g., recorded conference presentation, youtube, etc.). Fortunately, 
there are several “successful” models for web-based learning courses (e.g., Trauma Focused 
Cognitive Behavioral Therapy Web, Medical University of South Carolina, 
http://tfcbt.musc.edu/) that have started paving the way for mental health interventions. 
Important considerations in evaluating the effectiveness of web-based seminars also include 
clinicians’ adoption of strategies into practices--something that was outside the scope of the 
current study but that would be a meaningful future study.  
 Finally, strategies provided in the cognitive de-biasing intervention likely generalize 
to other aspects of patient care, including the assessment of other mental disorders and 
treatment decisions. Thus, although the current study concentrated on PBD, strategies may 
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generalize to other aspects of care by increasing clinicians’ awareness of common cognitive-
based errors and teaching them new ways of thinking. Further examination of 
generalizability to other challenging psychiatric diagnostic and treatment decisions will be 
important. 
Conclusion 
 This project used a randomized trial design to test the effects of cognitive de-biasing 
training on clinical decision-making about childhood mood disorders. Randomization 
assigned participating mental health professionals in a balanced manner in terms of 
professional training and experience (i.e., no evidence of randomization failure), and the 
training intervention produced statistically significant and medium to large effect sizes across 
most outcome measures. Participants rated the training as well-tolerated, as well as teaching 
them new content that they applied when working with the clinical vignettes. An important 
secondary aim of the study was experimentally manipulating the race of the clinical vignettes 
to test the possibility of clinical bias in the diagnosis of bipolar disorder. There was no 
significant difference in clinical decisions due to race. Overall, the study represents the 
beginning of a program of research that investigates how applying a decision-making lens to 
crucial diagnostic and treatment decisions can enhance clinical practice. Findings support 
future investigations of cognitive de-biasing interventions to improve the assessment of PBD 
and common comorbid conditions and, more generally, decision-making in mental health 
research and practice.     
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Table 1 
 Implications of faulty heuristics and biases for bipolar populations 
Heuristic/Bias Synonyms Examples Specific to Bipolar 
 
Practice Implication(s) 
 
Base rate neglect Representativeness exclusivity 
 
Not assessing for mania in cases of 
depression 
 
Underdiagnosis; Misdiagnosis; Delay in diagnosis; Suboptimal 
medication and treatment planning 
Diagnosis 
Momentum Diagnostic creep 
 
Placing too much faith in one’s 
early/first impressions 
 
Delay or missed diagnosis; Unwarranted interventions, costly 
Over-confidence bias Premature closure 
 
Thinking one knows more than one 
does; exaggerated certainty 
 
Delay or missed diagnosis; Unwarranted interventions, costly 
Race/ethnicity bias N/A 
 
Diagnosing African American youth 
with  conduct disorder or schizophrenia 
instead of bipolar disorder 
 
Misdiagnosis; Delay in diagnosis & treatment; Stigma 
 
Search satisficing 
 
Bounded rationality, 
keyhole viewing 
Stopping assessment after diagnosing 
ADHD (or bipolar disorder) 
 
Calling off the search once something has been found can lead to 
significant further findings being missed. 
 
Note. Source adapted from Bornstein & Emler, 2001; Croskerry, 2002; Elstein & Schwartz, 2002; Galanter & Patel, 2005 
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Table 2 
Examples of some potential symptom overlap between mania and ADHD 
Mania Presentation ADHD Presentation 
Elevated, expansive mood 
 
“Class clown’’, attention-seeking, silly behavior in children with ADHD which 
may be difficult to distinguish from elation* 
 
Irritable mood 
 
Low frustration tolerance, temper tantrums 
Increase in goal-directed activity or psychomotor agitation 
 
Runs about, leaves seat, on the go 
 
More talkative than usual; pressure to keep talking Talks excessively 
 
Distractibility  
 
Often distracted by extraneous stimuli 
 
Excessive involvement in activities with high 
potential for painful consequences 
 
Impulsivity may lead to accidents and to engagement in potentially dangerous 
activities without consideration of possible consequences 
Decreased need for sleep; sleeping less but no decrease in 
functioning 
 
Sleep disturbance; often trouble settling at night and rising early 
 
Inflated self esteem or grandiosity 
 
Children with ADHD may not appreciate danger or consequences of their actions; 
may engage in activities beyond their abilities; may be interpreted as grandiosity* 
 
Flight of ideas/or subjective experience of racing thoughts 
 
Distractibility may result in problems with topic maintenance 
 
 
These symptoms should represent a change in function; 
episodic symptoms instead of chronic presentation of illness  
  Symptoms should be chronic, starting before age 7 
Note. *Symptoms not part of DSM criteria but common in populations with ADHD. Table adapted from Dubicka, et al. (2008). 
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Table 3 
 Cognitive de-biasing strategies 
Strategy  
 
 
Mechanism/Action 
 
Develop insight/awareness Provide detailed descriptions and thorough characterizations of known cognitive biases, together with multiple clinical examples illustrating their adverse effects on decision-making and diagnosis and formulation 
Consider alternatives Establish forced consideration of alternative possibilities, e.g., the generation and working through of a differential diagnosis. Encourage routinely asking the question: What else might this be? 
Metacognition  Train for a reflective approach to problem solving:  stepping back from the immediate problem to examine and reflect on the thinking process 
Decrease reliance on memory         Improve the accuracy of judgments through cognitive aids: mnemonics, clinical practice guidelines, algorithms, hand-held computers 
Specific training Identify specific flaws and biases in thinking and provide directed training to overcome them: e.g., instruction in fundamental rules of probability, distinguishing correlation from causation, basic Bayesian probability theory 
Simulation 
Develop mental rehearsal, ‘‘cognitive walkthrough’’ strategies for specific clinical scenarios to allow cognitive 
biases to be made and their consequences to be observed; Construct clinical training videos contrasting incorrect 
(biased) approaches with the correct (de-biased) approach 
Cognitive forcing strategies 
 
Develop generic and specific strategies to avoid predictable bias in particular clinical situations 
 
Make task easier  Provide more information about the specific problem to reduce task difficulty and ambiguity; Make available rapid access to concise, clear, well-organized information 
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Table 4 
Actuarial estimates of likelihood of bipolar disorder for an outpatient setting 
 
Family History 
 
        PGBI  
     Test Score 
 
  
PGBI  
Categorical 
Description 
 
       1st degree          2nd degree                Fuzzy              None 
>11 Low 3% 2% 1% 1% 
11 to 20 Moderately Low 13% 7% 6% 3% 
21 to 30 Neutral 30% 18% 15% 8% 
31 to 42 Moderately High 42% 27% 23% 13% 
43 to 50 High 61% 44% 38% 24% 
> 51 Very High 67% 50% 45% 29% 
Note. Fuzzy family history refers to a past diagnosis of uncertain validity, or else a different diagnosis for which bipolar is often  
mistaken in a minority population (e.g., schizophrenia or conduct disorder) (DelBello, Lopez-Larson, Soutullo, & Strakowski, 2001;  
Strakowski, McElroy, Keck, & West, 1996). PGBI = Parent General Behavior Inventory. Table adapted from Youngstrom, et al. (2004). 
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Table 5 
Components of the cognitive de-biasing intervention for clinical judgment 
Strategy  Mechanism/Action Adapted to mental health for Assessing PBD 
Develop 
insight/awareness 
 
Provide detailed descriptions and thorough characterizations of known 
cognitive biases, together with multiple clinical examples illustrating 
their adverse effects on decision-making and diagnosis and formulation 
 
Education on: base-rate neglect; search satisficing; 
diagnosis momentum; overconfidence bias; and, 
race/ethnicity bias 
Consider 
alternatives 
Establish forced consideration of alternative possibilities, e.g., the 
generation and working through of a differential diagnosis.  
Symptom checklists; Encourage routinely asking the 
question: What else might this be? 
Metacognition  
 
Train for a reflective approach to problem solving:  stepping back from 
the immediate problem to examine and reflect on the thinking process 
 
Train to safeguard thinking by examining one’s own 
decision-making during and after assessment (before 
diagnosing a disorder) 
Decrease reliance 
on memory 
 
Improve the accuracy of judgments through cognitive aids: mnemonics, 
clinical practice guidelines, algorithms, hand-held computers 
 
Mnemonics: GRAPES; FIND 
Specific training  
Identify specific flaws and biases in thinking and provide directed 
training to overcome them: e.g., instruction in fundamental rules of 
probability, distinguishing correlation from causation, basic Bayesian 
probability theory 
Train on actuarial methodologies such as the 
nomogram, diagnostic likelihood ratios, and actuarial 
tables 
Simulation  
 
Develop mental rehearsal, ‘‘cognitive walkthrough’’ strategies for 
specific clinical scenarios to allow cognitive biases to be made and 
their consequences to be observed; Construct clinical training videos 
contrasting incorrect (biased) approaches with the correct  
(debiased) approach 
 
Opportunities to practice decision-making with case 
information (e.g., how to apply actuarial methods with  
client data) 
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Table 5 cont. Components of the cognitive de-biasing intervention for clinical judgment 
Strategy Mechanism/Action Adapted to mental health for Assessing PBD 
Cognitive forcing 
strategies 
 
Develop generic and specific strategies to avoid predictable bias in 
particular clinical situations 
 
Provide examples of race/ethnicity bias and search 
satisficing errors 
Make task easier  
Provide more information about the specific problem to reduce task 
difficulty and ambiguity; Make available rapid access to concise, clear, 
well-organized information 
Identify what pediatric bipolar disorder is (and is not); 
present mood graphs and highlight cognitive 
vulnerabilities related to heterogeneity of the disorder 
 
  
    
81 
 
Table 6 
Overview of case vignettes 
 Vignette  
Cognitive 
error  Base-rate neglect Search satisficing Diagnosis momentum Overconfidence 
Demographics 14-year-old female 8-year-old male 10-year-old male 11-year-old female 
Symptoms Depression ADHD; some bipolar Some bipolar symptoms Classic mania 
Experimental 
manipulation Race/ethnicity Race/ethnicity Race/ethnicity Race/ethnicity 
 
Information 
gathered from 
participant 
 
Probable diagnosis: 
Pull down menu listing options 
which were recoded into 
“inaccurate”, “somewhat 
accurate”, or “accurate” 
Probable diagnosis: 
Pull down menu listing options 
which were recoded into 
“inaccurate”, “somewhat 
accurate”, or “accurate” 
Probable diagnosis: 
Pull down menu listing options 
which were recoded into 
“inaccurate”, “somewhat 
accurate”, or “accurate” 
Probable diagnosis: 
Pull down menu listing options 
which were recoded into 
“inaccurate”, “somewhat 
accurate”, or “accurate” 
 
Next clinical action: 
Family of variables including 
more assessment, therapy, 
medication, other, or no Tx 
Next clinical action: 
Family of variables including 
more assessment, therapy, 
medication, other, or no Tx 
Next clinical action: 
Family of variables including 
more assessment, therapy, 
medication, other, or no Tx 
Next clinical action: 
Family of variables including 
more assessment, therapy, 
medication, other, or no Tx 
 N/A N/A 
Probability of PBD:  
Participants rate the probability 
of a bipolar diagnosis from 0 to 
100 
N/A 
 
 N/A N/A N/A 
Case-study multiple test: 
5 M/C questions, participants 
rate confidence for each answer 
Analyses 
Logistic and PLUM Regression 
 to predict DME & Dx 
accuracy 
Logistic and PLUM Regression 
 to predict DME & Dx 
accuracy 
Logistic and PLUM Regression 
to predict DME& Dx accuracy;  
ANCOVA; one sample t-test 
PLUM Regression to predict     
DME & Dx accuracy;          
ANCOVA 
Note. Race/ethnicity of the vignette character was Caucasian or African American. The order in which vignettes was presented to participants was  
random.  Dx = diagnostic. Tx = treatment. DME = decision-making error. M/C = multiple choice. PLUM = Polytomous Universal. Model. ANCOVA  
= Analysis of Covariance
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Table 7 
Participant Demographics 
Characteristic 
Control Group 
( n = 47) 
n (%) 
Treatment Group 
( n = 32) 
 n (%) 
Total 
( N = 79) 
N (%) 
Gender: Female 42 (89) 26 (81) 68 (86) 
Age   
          < 30 17 (36) 13 (40) 30 (38) 
          31-45 24 (51) 14 (44) 34 (43) 
          > 45 6 (13) 5 (16) 11 (14) 
Race/ethnicity   
          Asian 3 (6) 4 (13) 7 (9) 
          African American 0 (0) 2 (6) 2 (3) 
          Caucasian 38 (81) 23 (72) 61 (77) 
          Latino 3 (6) 2 (6) 5 (6) 
        Other 2 (4) 1 (3) 3 (4) 
Current Geographical Location in US   
          Southern 8 (17) 6 (19) 14 (18) 
          Northeast 15 (32) 14 (44) 29 (37) 
          Western 15 (32) 10 (31) 25 (32) 
          Midwest 9 (19) 2 (6) 11 (14) 
Note. Tx = treatment. Chi-square tests indicate that the treatment and control groups did not significantly differ on 
any demographic factors, p >.05. 
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Table 8 
Participant Characteristics 
Characteristic 
Control 
Group ( n = 
47) 
n (%) 
Tx Group 
(n = 32) 
n (%) 
Total  
(N = 79) 
N (%) 
Professional Title   
     Counselor 6 (13) 4 (13) 10 (13) 
     Psychiatry 5 (11) 2 (6) 7 (9) 
     Psychology 23 (49) 17 (53) 40 (51) 
     Social Work 11 (23) 8 (25) 19 (24) 
     Other 2 (4) 1 (3) 3 (4) 
Psychology Professional 24 (51) 18 (56) 42 (53) 
Unlicensed, supervised professionals 15 (32) 11 (34) 26 (33) 
Primary theoretical orientation*   
     Cognitive Behavioral 35 (74) 19 (59) 54 (68) 
     Family Systems 9 (19) 7 (22) 16 (20) 
     Humanistic 5 (11) 0 (0) 5 (6) 
     Integrative 4 (9) 11 (34) 15 (19) 
     Psychoanalytic 4 (9) 1 (3) 5 (6) 
     Emotion Focused Therapy 3 (6) 4 (13) 7 (9) 
     Other 1 (2) 2 (6) 3 (4) 
Primary clinical setting*   
     Community Mental Health 11 (23) 10 (31) 21 (27) 
     University Setting 5 (11) 5 (16) 10 (13) 
     Hospital (inpatient and outpatient) 14 (30) 11 (34) 25 (32) 
     School 12 (26) 2 (6) 14 (18) 
     Private Practice 2 (4) 3 (9) 5 (6) 
     Residential 3 (6) 3 (9) 6 (8) 
     Other 4 (9) 4 (13) 8 (10) 
Primary professional activity*   
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Table 8 cont. Participant Characteristics 
     Clinical service 42 (89) 27 (84) 69 (87) 
     Research 6 (13) 3 (9) 9 (11) 
     Administration 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 
     Teaching 1 (2) 1 (3) 2 (3) 
     Other 1 (2) 2 (6) 3 (4) 
Years of experience  9.81 (SD=7.85) 9.78 (SD=6.86) 9.8 (SD=7.24) 
Trained in evidence-based practice 44 (94) 32 (100) 76 (96) 
Attended Dr. Eric Youngstrom’s continuing  
     education seminar 4 (9) 2 (6) 6 (8) 
Note. *Percentages may exceed 100% as a result of some participants endorsing more than one primary clinical 
setting, theoretical orientation, and/or professional activity. Tx = treatment. Chi-square tests indicate that the 
treatment and control groups did not significantly differ on any demographic factors, p >.05; results from a t-test 
indicate that treatment and control groups did not significantly differ in years of clinical experience, p >.05. 
 
 
   
 85 
 
 
 
 Table 9 
 Participants’ Primary Client/Patient Population 
 
Patient/Client Demographic 
Control Group 
( n = 47) 
n (%) 
Tx Group 
( n = 32) 
n (%) 
Total 
( N = 79) 
N (%) 
Primary Age Group   
     Children, ages 5-10 8 (17) 4 (13) 12 (15) 
     Adolescents, ages 11-17 16 (34) 12 (38) 18 (23) 
     Pediatric all ages, 5-17 7 (15) 5 (16) 12 (15) 
     Families 1 (21) 3 (9) 4 (5) 
     Adults 15 (32) 7 (22) 22 (28) 
     Couples 1 (2) 1 (3) 2 (3) 
Primary Diagnostic Group   
     Anxiety Disorder 6 (13) 2 (6) 8 (10) 
     Mood Disorder 12 (26) 8 (25) 20 (25) 
     Oppositional Defiant and Conduct Disorders 3 (6) 2 (6) 5 (6) 
     Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder 13 (28) 9 (28) 22 (28) 
     Substance Disorders 2 (4) 1 (3) 3 (4) 
     Schizophrenia 0 (0) 2 (6) 2 (3) 
     Personality Disorder 2 (4) 1 (3) 3 (4) 
     Adjustment Disorder 6 (13) 3 (9) 9 (11) 
     Trauma 5 (11) 9 (28) 14 (18) 
     Other 6 (13) 3 (9) 9 (11) 
Note. Percentages exceed 100% as a result of some participants endorsing more than one primary age group 
and/or diagnostic category; Tx = treatment. Chi-square tests indicate that the treatment and control groups did not 
significantly differ on any demographic factors, p >.05.    
 86 
 
 
 
Table 10 
Performance on Case Vignettes: Summary of Decision-Making Errors 
Total Number of Errors 
Control Group 
( n = 47) 
n (%) 
Tx Group 
( n = 32) 
n (%) 
Combined Total 
( N = 79) 
N (%) 
0 0 (0) 3 (9) 3 (4) 
1 2 (4) 12 (38) 14 (18) 
2 7 (15) 6 (19) 13 (17) 
3 20 (44) 4( 13) 24 (31) 
4 17 (17) 7 (22) 24 (31) 
Note.  High scores indicate more decision-making errors. An independent-samples t-test comparing the mean 
scores of the treatment and control groups found a significant difference between the means of the two groups 
(t(76) = 4.24,  p < .0005). The mean of the treatment group (M =2.00 , SD =1.34 ) than the mean of the control 
group (M =3.13 , SD =.83 ). 
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Table 11 
Performance on Case Vignettes: Summary of Diagnostic Accuracy Ratings 
Accuracy 
Rating 
Control Group 
( n = 47) 
n (%) 
Tx Group 
( n = 32) 
n (%) 
Combined Total 
( N = 79) 
N (%) 
4 0 (0) 0 (0) (0) 
5 2 (4) 0(0) 2 (3) 
6 9 (20) 3 (9) 12 (15) 
7 14 (30) 6 (19) 20 (26) 
8 13 (28) 5 (16) 18 (23) 
9 6 (13) 1 (3) 7 (9) 
10 2 (4) 10 (31) 12 (15) 
11 0 (0) 5 (16) 5 (6) 
12 0 (0) 2 (6) 2 (3) 
Note. High scores indicate more accurate diagnostic decisions. An independent-samples t-test comparing 
the mean scores of the treatment and control groups found a significant difference between the means of the 
two groups (t(76) = -4.36, p < .0005). The mean of the treatment group (M =9.00 , SD =1.83 ) than the 
mean of the control group (M =7.39 , SD =1.20 ). 
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Table 12 
Predictors of Risk Estimates 
Model  B t p 
Group Status -8.79 -2.03 .04 
Years of Clinical Experience .21 .75 .45 
Professional Title -4.38 -1.01 .31 
Subjective Numeracy Scale Score 2.05 -.69 .49 
Previous exposure to Bayesian approach -1.77 -.22 .82 
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Combining Base Rate, Family History, and Test Score 
Figure 1. Comparison of Participant Risk Estimates by Control and Treatment 
Groups. Gray bars indicate the range within +/- 5% of the true risk estimate which 
was 27%. We adjusted the true risk estimate to 0% (and subtracted 27 from 
participants’ estimates) for the purposes of the regression equation. Tx = treatment. 
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Appendix A 
Nomogram for combining probability with diagnostic likelihood ratios 
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Appendix B 
 
Demographic and background questionnaire 
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Appendix C 
Brief questionnaire about participants’ experience completing vignettes 
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Apendix D 
Clinician attitudes toward intervention (for participants in the treatment group only) 
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Appendix E 
Case vignettes 
 
Vignette 1:  Joey, a 7-year-old Caucasian male, is in the second grade and has been referred by his school 
teacher for concentration difficulties and extreme hyperactivity. Joey’s teacher reports that he cannot stay 
in his seat and that he frequently blurts out answers in class. In addition to getting in trouble for his 
disruptive behavior in class, Joey’s school performance is also suffering from his inattention to detail and 
his problems following instructions. When you meet with Joey’s mother, she describes his behavior as if 
he is “driven by a motor” and “constantly on the go.” You also learn from her that Joey has bouts of 
irritability, increased energy, and sleep disturbance- sometimes sleeping very little and not seeming tired 
the next day.  
    
 
 
 
 
Vignette 2:  Lizzy is a 14-year-old Caucasian female who has been referred to your clinic by her mother 
for sadness and frequent crying spells. Over the last month, Lizzy has become less interested in 
extracurricular activities that she used to really enjoy, including soccer and debate team. She has also 
experienced decreases in energy and appetite. When you meet with Lizzy, she describes feeling guilty a 
lot of the time and wanting to sleep more than normal. According to Lizzy and her mother, she has been 
experiencing these symptoms for about two and a half weeks. 
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Vignette 3:  Michael, a Caucasian male age 10, has been referred to an outpatient community mental 
health center for extreme motor agitation and aggression. Michael’s mother reports that Michael “cycles” 
frequently; she believes he has bipolar disorder. Michael’s biological paternal grandfather was diagnosed 
with bipolar I disorder and has been treated with lithium for several years. Michael’s mother completes 
the Parent General Behavior Inventory (PGBI), a questionnaire that asks specific questions about 
children’s mood symptoms. Michael earns a score of 35, which is considered a moderately high score, 
indicating some increased probability of having bipolar disorder.  
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
Vignette 4:  Lynda is an 11-year-old Caucasian female in mainstream school. Psychological testing 
described week long periods of frequent impulsivity, tendencies to discuss topics unrelated to tasks she 
was completing, intermittent outbursts of anger and anxiety, significantly elevated levels of physical 
activity, difficulties sitting still, and touching everything. Over the past year, Lynda has also become very 
angry, irritable, destructive and capricious. She is provocative and can be cruel to pets and small children. 
She has been sexually inappropriate with peers and family members including "expressing interest in 
lewd material on the internet, 'Play Girl' magazine, and she has been hugging and kissing peers." She tells 
her family that she will be attending medical school, or will become a record producer, a professional 
wrestler or an acrobat. Overall, Lynda’s behavior changes are causing her substantial problems at home 
and at school. Throughout this period, there have been substantial marital difficulties between the parents 
with resultant family stress and upheaval; however, none of Lynda’s siblings have been affected to a 
marked extent.  
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Appendix F 
Multiple Choice Questions for Mania Vignette 
Lynda’s difficulty sitting still and touching everything is most likely a sign of: 
a) hyperactivity common to ADHD 
b) psychomotor agitation 
c) oppositional behavior 
d) developmentally appropriate behavior 
e) attention seeking behavior 
 
I am ___% confident in my response. 
 
Lynda telling her family that she will attend medical school or become a record producer, professional wrestler, or an 
acrobat, is most likely a sign of: 
a) deceitfulness 
b) typical aspirations of someone her age 
c) irritability 
d) grandiosity 
e) delusional thinking 
 
I am ___% confident in my response. 
 
Lynda currently meets DSM criteria for: 
a) Schizophrenia 
b) Conduct Disorder 
c) Bipolar I Disorder 
d) Bipolar II Disorder 
e) Cyclothymic Disorder 
 
I am ___% confident in my response. 
 
Lynda’s interest in lewd material on the Internet, “Play Girl” magazine, and her hugging and kissing her peers is likely 
a sign of: 
a) past trauma 
b) poor socialization skills 
c) age appropriate behavior 
d) hypersexuality 
e) attention seeking behavior 
 
I am ___% confident in my response. 
 
The change in her functioning is most likely due to: 
a) asperger’s or autistic traits 
b) her parents’ marital conflict 
c) age appropriate behavior, within normal limits for her age 
d) attention problems 
e) mood disturbance 
 
I am ___% confident in my response. 
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Appendix G 
Subjective Numeracy Scale (Fagerlin, et al,, 2007) 
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